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This paper analyzes the development of trade unions' adaptation strategies towards the new 
challenge posed by the dualization of national labour markets into a stable core of standard 
employment and a growing margin of flexible, often precarious employment. On the basis of the 
controversial discussion surrounding the theory of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC), the main objective 
is to shed light on the question of how institutional frameworks shape unions´ adaptation 
strategies. By comparing the developments and union strategies in Germany, Poland and Slovenia 
– identified as traditionally rather coordinated market economies – the paper aims to connect the 
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The increase of  global competition, the transnationalization of  capital flows, the dismantling of  trade 
barriers and expansion of  post-industrial sectors during the last three decades have put national market 
economies and their established institutional arrangements under pressure. Scholarly and public debate 
over the future of  European welfare regimes has tended to posit a simple choice between convergence 
towards the Anglo-American liberal market economies or protection of  the continental European ´social 
model´ (Albert 1993; Hall/ Soskice 2001). Observing trends towards liberalization and deregulation in 
Western European economies since the 1980s, convergence advocates draw the inescapable conclusion 
that capitalist economies will become more alike in their institutional make-up in order to compete 
successfully in a global economy. The austerity and deregulation regime of  the EU seems to perpetuate 
these structural pressures on the national institutional regimes. The (neo-)liberal model is assumed to 
ultimately trump the more coordinated and frequently more socially oriented European welfare regimes 
(cf. Hancké 2009: 1).  
Non-convergence advocates conversely stress that even though the core logic of  capital accumulation is 
the same, cross-country variation can be observed in the way capitalism is socially organized. Against this 
background of  continued differences in the face of  shared structural pressures, a vast amount of  political 
economy and social policy literature developed (Esping-Andersen 1990; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Schmidt 
2002). It is however the much-cited work The Varieties of  Capitalism (2001) by Hall and Soskice, which 
provided one of  the central theories in comparative political economy. Instead of  converging on a single 
liberal model, the authors argued that globalization would increase the differences between political 
economies, as they rely on the comparative institutional advantages associated with different socio-
economic models. Hall and Soskice (2011: 7) distinguished in particular between “coordinated and liberal 
market economies” as two ideal types of  capitalism. The Varieties of  Capitalism (henceforth VoC) theory 
triggered a heated debate on the resilience of  institutional arrangements in the face of  global economic 
pressures. A body of  research has developed that either refutes VoC theory or seeks to revise its 
weaknesses. Regarding the latter, a lot of  research has focused on identifying more nuanced types of  
regional institutional regimes. Thereby, not only Western Europe but also the former ´socialist´ Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) states have attracted increasing attention (King 2007; Lane et al. 2007; 
Bohle/ Greskovits 2007, 2012; Emmenegger et al. 2012).  
Dividing the world up into different types of  welfare regimes however runs the danger of  over-simplifying 
and over-determining it. VoC theory is largely focused on differences between and similarities within 
particular types of  market economies. Institutional diversity within similar regimes becomes a blind spot 
(Coates 2005; Boyer 2005a; Crouch 2005). This intra-regime variety is not implied in the original VoC 
approach and has received only little attention by subsequent research (Busemeyer 2011; Eichhorst/ Marx 
2012). It thus constitutes the puzzle to be examined by this thesis. However, intra-regime variety raises not 
only a theoretical but also political problem. Ignoring within-system diversity is fatal since local actors and 
their strategies are first and foremost shaped by the national institutional context, which provides the 
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primary framework for action and shapes their opportunity structures. Thus, in the face of  new 
challenges, the formulation of  adequate adaptation strategies depends on an accurate assessment of  the 
limits and opportunities within a particular institutional framework. The goal of  this work is to assess the 
impact of  intra-regime variety on local actors´ strategies towards new challenges. It thereby hopes to 
provide insights on how useful intra-regime variety is as an approach to be further explored within VoC 
theory. 
The concrete case of  analysis is constituted by trade union responses towards the massive expansion of  
precarious work in Europe´s traditionally more coordinated and social economies (Brinkmann et al. 2006; 
Birke 2010). In order to connect the still much separated debates on regional varieties of  capitalism in 
Western and Eastern Europe, the thesis compares the developments in the two relatively successful post-
socialist transformation cases of  Slovenia and Poland with the frequently studied case of  Germany. As 
will be shown, instead of  a rapid and wholesale deregulation of  the labour markets, deregulation spreads 
at the margins aside a still regulated core of  standard employment. This so-called ´dualization´ between 
the established coordinated and increasingly competitive labour market institutions confronts not only 
those directly affected with hardships. It also confronts trade unions, the ´collective associations for 
advancing the interest of  employees in their workplace and in society’ with new challenges (Ebbinghaus 
2010: 200).  
On the basis of  the initial work of  Hall and Soskice, one would expect trade unions within similar 
industrial relations to react similarly. Instead of  stressing the similarities of  union responses, this thesis 
seeks to make the differences visible in order to examine the impact of  intra-regime variety on trade 
unions´ adaptation strategies. The research question guiding this work asks to what extent the varieties of  industrial 
relations (independent variable) in the similar coordinated institutional regimes of  Germany, Slovenia and Poland (context) 
explain differences in union strategies towards labour market dualization (dependent variable). A number of  research 
objectives are embraced by this question. First, the goal is to clarify an empirical observation, namely why 
trade unions pursue particular strategies in the way they address precarious work. The second objective is 
to investigate how strongly these reflect national institutional variety. Third, the work aims at assessing 
how sufficient the institutional approach is to explain trade unions´ adaptation strategies and to draw 
conclusions for areas of  future research for VoC theory.  
In order to answer the research question and objectives, this work is organized as follows. The subsequent 
chapter elaborates on VoC and dualization theory, which inform the theoretical frame of  the work. 
Thereafter, the third chapter specifies the comparative method as well as the conceptualization and 
operationalization of  the variables (chapter 3). These two chapters form the basis for the comparative case 
study. Chapter 4 introduces the country selection and discusses the shared context. More precisely, it 
discusses to what extent coordinated institutional systems can be observed in these three countries and in 
which particular pattern dualization emerged. The subsequent two chapters analyze the dependent and 
independent variables. Chapter 5 outlines the most noteworthy trade union responses towards precarious 
work. Chapter 6 compares the core features of  the industrial relations systems of  the three countries. 
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Finally, chapter 7 discusses the research findings. It evaluates how the national institutional frameworks 
have shaped the observed union strategies and assesses the sufficiency of  the institutional approach as 
explanatory approach. From this, a future outlook on union strategies and conclusions for VoC theory 
shall be drawn. 
 
2. Theoretical Frame: Varieties of Capitalism and Dualization Theory 
2.1. Varieties of Capitalism: Theory, Shortcomings and Revisions 
Institutional factors have figured prominently in explanations of  why countries pursued different 
responses to the common economic challenges since the 1970s and 1980s. Hall and Soskice make two 
central claims: first, even in a globalized era there are groups of  national production regimes with 
distinctive institutional configurations; and second, these varieties of  capitalism are resistant towards 
convergence (Hall/ Soskice 2001). The starting point for these assumptions is the consideration that 
firms´ strategies to maximize profits and meet the challenges of  the global economy are shaped by 
institutional configurations. Unlike previous works, Hall and Soskice do not focus on the coordination 
within a single institutional arena but on an integrated, systemic view that provides linkages across all of  
the major institutions defining capitalist political economies, including for instance industrial relations, 
vocational training and education, social policy, financial arrangement and corporate governance (cf. 
Thelen 2012: 138). This is captured in the concept of  “institutional complementarities”, according to 
which institutional subsystems reinforce each other and guarantee the efficiency and stability of  the 
greater institutional framework (Hall/ Soskice 2001: 17). VoC theory argues that firms have organized 
their production strategies around these institutional complementarities and draw comparative advantages 
from it (ibid.). Thus, they allegedly tend to support and reproduce them. In times of  economic crisis this 
allegedly deepens national differences instead of  leading to convergence. 
At the heart of  VoC theory is the notion of  variety between types of  institutional systems. Hall and Soskice 
(2009: 27) distinguish two ideal configurations of  institutional arrangements: “coordinated market 
economies” (CMEs) found in much of  continental Europe (Germany, France, Austria) and “liberal market 
economies” (LMEs) of  the Anglo-Saxon world (US, UK). Both “represent different ways to organize 
capitalism and, although operating on a different logic, are durable even in the face of  new strains” 
(Thelen 2012: 138). LMEs are characterized by the prevalence of  competitive relations between actors in 
its institutional sub-systems, including corporate governance, financial arrangements, industrial relations, 
inter-firm contacts and skills (re)production (cf. Bohle/ Greskovits 2012: 10f.). They display decentralized 
labour markets, which centre on mobile assets. Employment is thus more flexible, short-termed and 
deregulated. Their industrial relations display low levels of  union density, company-level bargaining with 
limited extension to other workers, limited employers´ coordination across firms and poorly functioning 
mechanisms of  social dialogue (cf. Crowley/ Stanojević 2011: 270). Since this market-generated flexibility 
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is conducive for promoting innovation strategies, LMEs supposedly have a comparative advantage in high-
tech, high-risk sectors (cf. Hancké 2009: 4).  
Conversely, according to Hall and Soskice (2009: 35) CMEs display non-competitive but rather consensual 
and cooperative relations. Firms rely on specific assets, whose value depends on the active operation of  
others. High-value added and skill-dependent manufacturing industry relies on specific skills, which are 
imparted through a complementary training system. CMEs thus rule world markets in sectors, where 
incremental innovation is vital to success, such as manufacturing (cf. Hancké 2009: 4). Labour markets are 
therefore less mobile and employment is less subjected to competition. The industrial relations are 
characterized by strong trade unions with high levels of  union membership. Important for this work: the 
industrial relations of  CMEs display strong levels of  labour inclusion through institutional mechanisms of  
coordination, primarily sector-level collective bargaining and social dialogue, which are also stipulated by 
law. These provide unions with relatively high levels of  “institutional power”, which outlasts short-term 
fluctuations in the social balance of  power and whereby unions can directly impact the working conditions 
of  employees (Brinkmann et al. 2008: 25). Instead of  open class conflict, organized labour thereby 
becomes part of  the national institutional status quo. Employers are typically well organized too, resulting 
in collective agreements with a high coverage rate (cf. Crowley/ Stanojević 2011: 271).  
The original VoC approach must be embedded into the theoretical school of  New Institutionalism 
(Lowndes 1996; Immergut 1998; Hall/ Taylor 2006). Within this wide debate, Hall and Soskice brought 
forward a theoretical approach, which follows primarily rational choice institutionalism but also entails 
historical institutionalism. The assumption that coordinated institutions are created and used by firms to 
overcome collective action problems and to maximize their interests constitutes rational choice 
institutionalism. The original approach however also emphasises the importance of  initial choices and 
anticipates that local actors stick to and reinforce existing institutions. This entails a notion of  path 
dependency and historical institutionalism.  
As outlined in the introduction, the initial work by Hall and Soskice has triggered an intense debate.1 
Although starting from a firm-centred assumption, the dichotomy between CMEs and LMEs and the idea 
of  self-reinforcing institutional complementarities have been criticized for ignoring within-system diversity 
and for institutional determinism (Boyer 2005a; Coates 2005; Pontusson 2005). Treating nation-states as 
reified, sealed units disregards underlying power and class relations (Schmidt 2002; Crouch/ Farrell 2004; 
Pontusson 2005). In this context, in particular the argument that capital rather than labour has been 
central to the creation and continued viability of  distinct institutional and production regimes has attracted 
much criticism. Neo-Marxian authors and power resource theory suggest that national differences do not 
result from national actors promoting ´their´ national institutional complementarities but from differences 
in class relations and different mobilization-capacities of  working-class organisations (Korpi 2006; 
Crowley/ Stanojević 2011). 
                                                 
1 Hancké (2009: 5-12, 273-300) provides a comprehensive overview.  
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Another complex of  criticism argues that the original work is too static, status-quo-biased and thereby 
apolitical in its approach on institutions (Kinderman 2005; Pontusson 2005; Streeck/ Thelen 2009). Being 
too focused on permanency and path-dependence, it misses important dynamic elements of  economic 
change and institutional transformation (Crouch/ Farrell 2004; Hall/ Thelen 2009; Streeck/ Thelen 2009). 
Thereby, VoC theory has supposedly ignored the recasting of  national policies and institutions in similar 
ways since the 1970/80ies. This includes cuts in wages and social expenditures, the relocation of  
production towards the global periphery, increasing privatization and financialization, the deregulation of  
employment regimes, the decentralization of  industrial relations and attacks on organized labour (cf. 
Hancké 2009: 6; Demirović/ Sablowski 2012: 11). Ultimately, Bohle and Greskovits (2012: 11) also remind 
that VoC theory derives many of  its insights from the German, British and North-American forms of  
capitalism and draw attention to the limits of  application to the ´new´ CEE market economies. 
Much of  the criticism brought forward rightly reveals the weaknesses of  the original approach. In the 
course of  the debate surrounding capitalist variety, a lot of  powerful contributions have been developed 
by other scholars, which advance the initial ideas of  Hall and Soskice. One central theme constitutes the 
understanding of  ´institutions´. Hancké et al. (2009: 277) argue that VoC theory can provide for a non-
deterministic understanding of  institutions, given its appreciation that institutions are subject to constant 
re-negotiation by the actors involved. Similarly, Streeck and Thelen (2009) emphasize the need for a more 
dynamic approach towards institutions. Defining institutions as “social regimes” emphasizes their “being 
continuously created and recreated by a great number of  actors with divergent interests, varying normative 
commitments, different powers and limited cognition” (ibid.: 108, 112). Institutions come to be 
understood as ´stabilizations of  social power relations between forces of  capital, labour and the state´, 
which regulate their relations in a certain mode ´across short-term cyclical deviations´ to guarantee a 
historically-specific accumulation regime (cf. Urban 2014: 304). Institutions should be perceived as filters, 
which influence actors´ preferences and power relations, shape and limit actors´ strategies and goals, but 
also open options and resources for action (cf. Müller-Jentsch 1996: 46).  
Understanding institutions as dynamic, political and social regimes, which are filled by power relations, allows 
taking account of  institutional change. Change is not understood as major rupture caused by exogenous 
shocks and leading to full-scale convergence, but in line with Streeck and Thelen (2009: 115-125), rather as 
numerous incremental processes causing gradual institutional transformation. Policy-makers prefer reforms, 
which do not directly challenge the core of  established institutions (Palier/ Thelen 2008; Eichhorst/ Marx 
2012). According to Palier (2005: 131), they introduce liberalization policies mainly at the margins 
alongside the politically firmly established old institutions. Masked by stability on the surface, this allows 
for liberalization to proceed incrementally, without much rupture or resistance. The processes of  
incremental institutional change are diverse. Most famously, Streeck and Thelen (2009: 126) identified five 
types: “drift”, “displacement, “layering”, “conversion” and “exhaustion”. “Drift” for instance takes place 
when institutions fail to be maintained by adapting to changing circumstances (ibid.). Established 
institutions can also become ´converted´ through redeployment to new purposes. Or they become 
´displaced´ through simple defection of  actors from established procedures. The last chapter illustrates 
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these transformational processes on the concrete cases. In a nutshell, many small changes in the operation 
transform the formally intact institutional framework in the long-run.  
Much of  the criticism of  the initial approach by Hall and Soskice is acknowledged by this work. It is 
believed that if  the outlined revisions are incorporated, VoC theory can nonetheless provide a valuable 
analytical tool to compare the complex processes to be observed in the institutional frameworks of  
European market economies. One such development has been the incremental expansion of  precarious 
employment aside from the traditionally regulated and protected standard employment: the dualization of  
labour markets. 
2.2. Labour Market Dualization in Coordinated Market Economies 
Labour markets take up a central role in the discussion of  capitalist variety versus convergence. In the face 
of  economic global pressures, a number of  scholars claim that in CMEs structural pressures have not led 
to a wholesale deregulation but to a dualization into a core and a peripheral labour market (Palier/ Thelen 
2010; Emmenegger et al. 2012; Thelen 2012; Rueda 2012; Hassel 2014). In the core, the outlined 
arrangements of  CMEs are maintained, including the less mobile standard employment relationship and 
coordinated industrial relations between employers, trade unions and the state (the so-called ´social 
partners´). The revival of  corporatism during the economic and financial crisis beginning in 2008 
illustrates that high-production employers requiring skilled workers continue to attach importance to these 
institutions. 
Outside this core, features associated with LMEs spread, including the deregulation and flexibilization of  
employment, the decentralization of  industrial relations and more competitive relations between labour 
market actors (Palier/ Thelen 2008, 2010; Haipeter 2011; Thelen 2012). The growth of  post-industrial 
private services, which are more flexible either in terms of  the skills of  their workers or the production-
site, adds a liberal, labour-hostile environment. Here, employers push for the deregulation of  employment 
and defect from coordinated industrial relations. Linking back to the preceding debate on institutional 
change, dualization theory demonstrates how institutions are transformed not through a direct attack but 
through incremental transformative “change transpiring through the differential spread of  market forces” 
(Thelen 2012: 147). According to Busemeyer (2011: 5), “no political actor would openly promote 
dualization”. Instead, it is taking place by the outlined processes of  institutional displacement, layering and 
drift. This new kind of  institutional dualism is less egalitarian than before, but less harsh than in LMEs (cf. 
Palier/ Thelen 2010: 20). 
Insiders can be defined as workers in so-called ´standard employment´. This embraces protected and 
permanent jobs, which provide long-term stability, promotion prospects, salaries not considered as low-
wage and incremental wage increase (cf. Tomlinson/ Walker 2012: 59; Rueda 2012: 521).2 Working in the 
same and mostly big companies, they have better possibilities for collective action. They dispose over 
privileged access to the policy-making arena through powerful works councils, trade union representation 
                                                 
2 Low-wage work is defined as earning less than two-thirds of the average national net wage (cf. Bispinck/ Schulten  
  2011: 15). 
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and political parties. Outsiders are either unemployed or in atypical employment, this is non-standard 
employment including temporary and part-time employment, occasional jobs below the threshold of  
social security, low-wage jobs, solo self-employment and agency work (ibid.). While not all atypical and 
flexible jobs are precarious, most of  these employment forms have a precarious potential. They imply 
material, social and psychological insecurity as they hardly provide for a living wage, long-term stability 
and only marginal social security (cf. Brinkmann et al. 2006: 19; Rueda 2012: 523; Schmeißer et al. 2012: 
10). They dispose over less political voice than insiders as they are more marginalized and isolated. 
Holding different political preferences and political power, this dualization into insiders and outsiders 
apparently leads to political conflict and division within the working class (cf. Häusermann/ Schwander 
2012: 42ff.). In the face of  market competition, core workforces and high-value business form “producer 
coalitions” (Hassel 2014: 62) or “cross-class coalitions” (Hall/ Soskice 2001: 58; Hall/ Gingerich 2004: 
28f.; Palier/ Thelen 2010: 120; Busemeyer 2011: 7), which apparently render dualization a stable 
equilibrium in CMEs.  
Dualization scholars claim that the recent expansion of  atypical and precarious employment stands out in 
comparison to earlier segmentation (cf. Emmenegger et al. 2012: 305ff.). First, the visibility of  outsiders 
has increased. Traditionally, precariousness used to be rather reflected in low wages, irregular work 
schedules and work intensification (cf. Mrozowicki et al. 2013: 271). The inclusion and institutionalization 
of  outsiders into the formal labour market through inferior employment statuses is however new. Second, 
the expansion and composition of  people affected is unprecedented and has become more systematic and 
encompassing. The share of  atypical employment in the overall workforce in the OECD has increased 
from an average of  10 percent to nowadays country-specific levels of  25-35 percent (cf. Emmenegger et 
al. 2012: 306). While low-skilled women and migrant workers have always been most vulnerable to 
precarious work, other groups of  workers, in particular young people are increasingly affected. Under the 
so-called ´Fordist class compromise´, outsiders were rather invisible to the political arena and left to the 
private sphere, where family arrangements provided protection (cf. Dörre 2009: 39-41; Müller-Jentsch 
1996: 44). While marginalization to the invisible private sphere still holds for many migrant outsiders, the 
welfare risks of  women and young people have become a salient issue on political agendas.  
Dualization theory draws on insights from segmentation theory (Doeringer/Piore: 1971; Struck et al. 
2008). While the latter focuses on theorizing firm strategies regarding the modus of  employment in the 
face of  market uncertainty, the former adds a macro-political dimension and emphasizes the role of  
political choices. Dualization theory examines how labour market dualization is politically promoted and 
institutionalized through labour laws, translated into social policy and also into political participation and 
representation through political parties and trade unions (cf. Palier/ Thelen 2010: 120; Emmenegger et al. 






“The translation of  structural pressures into policies and outcomes has to be understood 
as a political process, in which politically and economically stronger groups are using their 
power resources to insulate themselves from the negative effects of  these structural 
pressures, and in which governments make deliberate choices in favor or against outsiders. 
Thereby, changes in the labour market are translated into the social policy realm […]. 
Feedback effects and vicious circles are likely to strengthen this effect because weak 
labour attachment and social exclusion are associated with weaker political 








Dualization theory claims that this perpetuation of  insider-outsider divides through political choices into 
the realms of  social policy and political representation is a phenomenon associated with CMEs 
(Häusermann/ Schwander 2012; Obinger et al. 2012).3 Eichhorst and Marx (2012) also provide valuable 
insights on intra-regime variety within dualization. They show that employers and governments within 
CMEs face country-specific institutional constraints and have therefore used different but functionally-
equivalent paths to bypass them. They identify “defection from permanent employment”, “defection from 
full-time employment”, “defection from dependant employment”, increasing “wage dispersion” and 
“government sponsored labour-cheapening schemes” as the most frequently used pathways of  defection 
from standard employment (ibid.: 77f., 95). 
Inter-and intra-regime variations do not only stress the importance of  institutional pre-configuration but 
also of  the actors and actor coalitions reinforcing or undermining existing institutions (Amable 2003; 
Obinger et al. 2012; Thelen 2012). It is in particular the role of  trade unions, which this thesis seeks to 
discuss. They naturally oppose the deterioration of  employment conditions and expansion of  precarious 
work. Opposition has however frequently implied that unions exclude these groups of  workers from their 
interest representation and thereby perpetuate dualization (cf. Gumbrell-McCormick 2011: 297ff.). 
Furthermore, Thelen (2012: 154) suggests that where political economies continue to be dominated by 
skill-specific manufacturing industries, firms and their highly unionized workers jointly defend traditional 
institutions for their own good. As illustrated in more detail on the German case in chapter 4, these 
powerful manufacturing unions have often tacitly accepted the outsourcing of  instability and insecurity to 
outsiders in order to protect the security of  insiders (Palier/ Thelen 2010; Gumbrell-McCormick 2011; 
Thelen 2012; Hassel 2014). According to Palier and Thelen (2010: 124) “a divide has opened up within the 
labour movement between unions representing workers with different skill levels and different levels of  
organisation.” Being only weakly anchored in the private service sector, unions have less power to counter 
these trends and rely on their traditional routines in their member bastions instead, where they still enjoy a 
                                                 
3
 Häusermann and Schwander (2012) provide insightful comparative data to show that LMS reinforce, Scandinavian  
  market economies compensate and CMEs perpetuate these divides. For CMEs, they track dualisms between insiders  
  and outsiders in the labour market (measured through gross earnings power, access to and quality of  job mobility and  
  training), in social policy (effects of  taxes and transfers on net income differentials, pension policy) and in political  
  integration and representation (gap in union membership and electoral participation). This does however not imply that 
  outsiders are worst off  in absolute terms in CMEs (cf. Emmenegger et al. 2012: 309). The German welfare system 
  for instance accentuates the divides but is nonetheless more successful in preventing the onset of  poverty than the 
  British welfare system (cf. Tomlinson/ Walker 2012: 66). 
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lot of  influence. Hence, dualization theory tends to classify (in particular manufacturing) unions as 
promoters of  dualization.  
This work questions how stable this new pattern of  cross-class coalitions in the core between insiders, 
their unions and employers really is. As elaborated in the next chapter, it is certainly true that mainstream 
trade unions in CMEs have for a long time and more recently during the crisis management privileged the 
interests of  their core constituencies in the traditional (industrial) strongholds. Thereby, they neglected and 
tacitly approved the expansion of  a precarious margin. However, one cannot ignore that during the last 
decade mainstream unions even in core industries have come to increasingly address outsiders (cf. 
Gumbrell-McCormick 2011: 297; Bernaciak et al. 2014: 4). This allows for the assumption that trade 
unions assume a more ambiguous role in dualization. Addressing the expansion of  precarious work 
however confronts unions with severe challenges. After all, the competitive and more union-hostile rather 
than coordinated relations in this segment make union influence more difficult. As discussed at the 
beginning of  this chapter, the industrial relations institutions equip trade unions in CMEs with relatively 
high levels of  institutional power. Which adaptation strategies trade unions have developed to tackle this 
new challenge posed by labour market dualization and how they have been shaped by the country-specific 
institutional constraints and opportunities is the focus of  the subsequent comparative study.  
 
3. Methodology: Comparative Design and Operationalization  
It must first be pointed out more generally that comparative studies are characterized by a trade-off  
between the level of  abstraction and the depth of  country-specific analysis (cf. Jahn 2007: 9). While 
comparisons with small samples are limited in generalizability, they can better find similarities and 
differences among the selected cases as well as specific patterns in which theories are materialized (cf. 
Landmann 2003: 29). A sound country selection is therefore all the more important to achieve control 
over external variance where statistical methods would usually include control variables.  
The focus of  this small-sample comparison lies on explaining a specific observation, namely union 
strategies towards dualization. The research interest thus starts from a “y-centred” approach (Gschwend/ 
Schimmelfennig 2007: 21). In order to implement the research question (see introduction), the study 
follows the conventional comparative “most similar systems design” (MSSD) (Landmann 2003: 29; 
Lauth/ Winkler 2010: 55). The market economies of  Germany, Slovenia and Poland provide the common 
context of  the comparison. They display more or less similar coordinated institutional systems, in which 
global pressures for labour market deregulation have translated into dualization. Chapter 4 discusses the 
country selection and limitations in greater detail. Although the unions under investigation in these 
countries have recently begun to address outsiders, the question to be raised is why they pursue particular 
strategies (dependent variable). As mentioned previously, the goal is to assess to what extent intra-regime 
variance in the industrial relations can explain these particular strategies (independent variable). Figure 1 





Figure 1: Analytical Framework 
A number of  clarifications regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of  the dependent and 
independent variable must be added. Throughout the thesis, the reference to trade unions embraces 
mainstream unions, which regularly participate in the coordinated institutional mechanisms. More 
marginal, religious or explicitly political (e.g. anarcho-syndicalist) unions are excluded. In order to compare 
the influence of  national industrial relations frameworks on unions´ strategies, unions are investigated, 
which have a comparable degree of  political and institutional power and societal impact. The focus in 
Slovenia and Poland is on the national trade union confederations, in particular the Association of  Free 
Trade Unions of  Slovenia (ZSSS) in Slovenia and NSZZ Solidarność (Solidarność), the All-Poland 
Alliance of  Trade Unions (OPZZ) and Forum (FZZ) in Poland. In Germany, the focus is not on the 
Federation of  German Trade Unions (DGB) but on the two largest single branch-unions IG Metall (IGM) 
and the United Services Union (ver.di). There might be a certain degree of  distortion by looking at the 
encompassing confederations in Slovenia and Poland and on the branch-unions in Germany. However, the 
choice was deemed the best match since these unions concentrate institutional power at the most central 
level.  
The analysis of  the dependent variable concentrates on the period from the mid-2000s onwards, with the 
economic and financial crisis starting in 2008 receiving particular attention. Union responses are regarded 
twofold. Firstly, the work examines what unions have done to tackle the expansion and conditions of  
precarious work (chapter 5). This embraces unions´ agendas, demands and principal strategies, including 
forms of  cooperation, campaigns, actions or particular kinds of  discourses promoted. Secondly, after 
having discussed the varieties of  industrial relations, union responses are re-investigated under the frame 
of  how they have addressed precarious work (chapter 7.1.). Here, the analysis of  observations bases on 
insights by Mrozowicki et al. (2013), who distinguish between negotiation-based and unilateral trade union 
strategies. The former addresses union strategies based on coordinated mechanisms provided by and 
within the institutional framework, in particular tripartite or bipartite bargaining (see below). Unilateral 
strategies are conflict-oriented, mobilisation-and campaign-based tactics outside the institutional channels, 
which draw on mass media to raise awareness and build up public and political pressure for a certain 
problem on the local as well as on the national level (ibid.: 273). This is frequently linked to ´organizing´, a 
proactive union approach towards the recruitment and activation of  groups of  workers traditionally 
under-represented in trade unions, in particular precarious workers.4 It also implies the building up and 
                                                 
4 Organizing in the context of trade unions describes a concept and practice, which was re-discovered by trade 
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empowerment of  local structures of  labour representation, where possible through works councils, and 
requires a shift of  resources (Brinkmann et al. 2008; Wetzel et al. 2011). 
Regarding the independent variable, the focus lies on industrial relations, unions´ institutional framework 
for action and one of  the five sub-systems examined by Hall and Soskice (2001: 24). Theoretical 
approaches of  industrial relations vary from system-theoretical, Marxist, institutionalist, action-theoretical 
to economic approaches (cf. Müller-Jentsch 1996: 37-56). On the basis of  the previous theoretical 
discussion, this work assumes a modified approach, which incorporates the current state of  debate. This 
implies two angles of  investigation. The first follows Hall and Soskice and investigates industrial relations 
from an institutionalist approach (ibid.: 45-49). Unions´ preferences are assumed to be established by the 
institutional framework, resulting in strategies reinforcing it. To this end, the focus lies on the formal 
institutions of  industrial relations in CMEs (chapter 6.1.). Trade unions in CMEs are included as social partner 
into the national institutional system through neo-corporatist institutions (Maier 1984; Hall/ Soskice 
2001). Neo-corporatism is largely associated with so-called ´social dialogue´ or ´tripartite negotiations´. 
Both describe institutional mechanisms for negotiation between the state, employers´ associations and 
trade unions to agree on durable bargains regarding working conditions, social and economic policy (cf. 
Maier 1984: 40). Moreover, it is also associated with collective bargaining between employers and trade 
unions to regulate wages and working conditions, the so-called ´bipartite negotiations´. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, these institutional channels are the source for unions´ institutional power and to 
directly impact working conditions. The second angle of  investigation adds a dynamic and more political 
approach towards these institutions, which takes account of  underlying power relations and the possibility 
of  transformative change (see chapter 2.1.). This provides a critical indication of  the continued robustness 
of  social dialogue and collective bargaining, which represent the central modes of  labour market 
governance in the coordinated European ´social models´. This is operationalized by assessing their 
effectiveness and thus the effectiveness of  unions´ formal institutional power (chapter 6.2.).  
Empirical data comes from three sources. Firstly, relevant literature, latest country reports provided by 
online observatories such as EWCO and EIRO on developments in the industrial relations as well as data 
provided by the OECD, Eurostat and the ICTWSS database were reviewed.5 These sources informed the 
theoretical, conceptual and particular country analyses. Secondly, a low-level content analysis of  the 
EIRO-database helped to compare and assess union activities. To this end, all reports on union activities 
in the three respective countries in the period from 2010 until 2014 were reviewed and clustered according 
to ´what´ and ´how´ topics were addressed. Finally, four expert interviews were conducted via telephone 
with two representatives from Poland (Jan Czarzasty, Adam Mrozowicki), one from Germany (Steffen 
                                                                                                                                                        
  unions in North America and thus reflects the particularities of US labour legislation and the union hostile 
  environment there (cf. Krzywdzinski 2010: 280; Wetzel et al. 2011: 9-13). There is no universal approach and 
  understandings differ from narrow interpretations, which focus on quantitative membership increase, to wider 
  understandings, which imply grassroots-empowerment and political conflict. Brinkmann et al. (2008: 71ff.) provide 
  an overview of the different interpretations. 
5
 EWCO stands for European Working Conditions Observatory, EIRO stands for European Industrial Relations 
  Observatory, ICTWSS stands for Institutional Characteristics of  Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention 
  and Social Pacts. 
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Lehndorff) and one from Slovenia (Goran Lukič). Without the assessments and opinions of  these local 
experts, it would have been difficult to receive an adequate impression and to draw conclusions. This is all 
the more the case because the lack of  knowledge on the Polish and Slovenian language limited the 
literature review. All interviews were guideline based interviews with strong tendency to problem-centred 
interviewing (cf. Blatter et al. 2007: 61f.). They lasted approximately 40 to 80 minutes and were conducted 
between 18 April and 30 May 2014. More information on the interviewees can be found in appendix 1. The 
interview material, which was sent to the interviewees including an abstract and the interview guidelines, 
are provided in appendix 2.6 
The previous two chapters served to introduce the theoretical frame and methodological approach, which 
inform the concrete comparative study. The subsequent chapter introduces the case selection and 
discusses the common context. Thereafter, the dependent and independent variables are analyzed. 
                                                 
6 The clustered overview of  the content analysis and interview transcripts can be provided on request. 
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4. Context: Introducing the Country Cases 
 4.1 Germany, Slovenia and Poland as Variations of CMEs? 
The common context of  the comparative study is constituted by the presence of  coordinated institutional 
systems and labour market dualization. Germany constitutes a CME prototype in the work of  Hall and 
Soskice (2001) and also for dualization theory (Palier/ Thelen 2010; Eichhorst/ Marx 2011; Thelen 2012; 
Hassel 2014). The challenge therefore lies in assigning these attributes to the two Eastern European cases 
Slovenia and Poland. Bohle and Greskovits (2007, 2012) greatly contributed to removing a blind-spot in 
the discussion by identifying three main regime types in the CEE region, which emerged during the 
transformation period: the neoliberal market economies of  the Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania), 
the embedded liberal market economies of  the Visegrád states (Poland, Hungary, Slovak and Czech 
Republic) and the mixed South-Eastern states (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) with the exception of  Slovenia. 
Based on their analyses, a number of  crucial institutional features can be identified, which give reason to 
the country selection. They are mostly elaborated on in the second part of  this chapter. 
First, all three countries have traditionally displayed complex export-oriented manufacturing industries, 
requiring less mobile workers and more coordinated labour markets (cf. Palier/ Thelen 2010: 121; Crowley/ 
Stanojević 2011: 285; Bohle/ Greskovits 2012: 42, 46). Second, reminding of  the German ´social market 
economy´, in Slovenia and Poland social compromise policies and security systems emerged during the early 
1990s including unemployment benefits, minimum wage regulations and massive early retirement schemes. 
These were relatively advanced and generous in comparison to the Baltic region.7 Slovenia provided for a 
long time the region´s most generous welfare system to mitigate transformation costs, while in Poland 
social compromise policies were only partially generous and depicted a strong logic of  ´divide and pacify´ 
(Vanhuysse 2006; cf. Bohle/ Greskovits 2007: 454; ibid.: 2012: 222). Third, a coordinative and regulative role of  
the state was present. Slovenia´s policy-reformers pursued a gradual and shielded economic transformation 
path, whereas in Poland they secured quick neoliberal reforms and social cohesion by providing a range of  
public goods and welfare benefits (cf. Bohle/ Greskovits 2007: 453f.; ibid. 2012: 192f.). Fourth, 
coordinated neo-corporatist industrial relations emerged at least in Slovenia. Poland displays a mix of  liberal 
and coordinated elements and thus constitutes an Eastern European modification (cf. Bohle/ Greskovits 
2007: 452ff.; Glassner/ Keune 2010: 25, appendix 3a). Although extensively discussed in chapter 6, a short 
classification is useful to make aware of  an important limitation in the case selection. Collective bargaining 
in Germany and Slovenia is dominant at the sector level, while in Poland it is dominant at the company 
level (cf. Glassner et al. 2011: 321, appendix 3b). Furthermore, social dialogue was formally institutionalized 
in Slovenia and Poland through tripartite councils. Nevertheless, Poland is a mixed case in so far as its 
industrial relations are characterized by decentralized bargaining and pluralism on the one hand and 
tripartite social dialogue on the other, though the latter is often referred to as “illusory corporatism” (Ost 
2000: 503). 
                                                 
7 Bohle and Greskovits (2012: 35-41) provide comparative data on the levels of  compensation for transformation 
  costs, levels of  social partnership institutions and levels of  political participation in the first decade of  transition. 
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Considering their specific socialist legacies, Slovenia and Poland can only to a certain degree be similar to 
Western European CMEs. Unlike Germany, their new economic and political institutions developed while 
already being exposed to the forces of  globalization (cf. Bohle/ Greskovits 2012: 11). Against this 
background, Slovenia is an outstanding case in the post-socialist world. Until hit by the crisis in late 2008, 
the former Yugoslav republic was the post-socialist success story. A regulative pattern emerged, which 
mirrored the attributes of  Western European small states: “economic openness, protective and efficiency-
enhancing compensatory policies, macroeconomic stability and governance by established democratic and 
neo-corporatist institutions” (ibid.: 182). Academic literature thus classifies Slovenia as CME (cf. Hancké 
et al. 2009: 291, Crowley/ Stanojević 2011: 270). 
Poland corresponds less to the category of  CMEs. It exhibits a mix of  liberalism and coordination, often 
labelled “liberal dependent” (Hancké et al. 2009: 297) or “embedded liberalism” (Bohle/ Greskovits 2012: 
3). Despite the unique Solidarność legacy, organized labour was only weakly included. Corporatism is 
formally institutionalized but structurally weak as it was never fully consolidated. The “welfarist social 
contract” (ibid.: 152) was implemented from above on ad hoc basis by political elites to prevent social 
conflict in the face of  neoliberal shock therapy. While Slovenia seems to have capitalized on the mutually 
reinforcing effects of  complementary institutions reminiscent of  the German CME, complementarities 
and coordination as understood in VoC theory are rather unstable and incoherent in Poland (cf. Bohle/ 
Greskovits 2007: 454; Hancké et al. 2009: 298). Although Poland must be perceived as an Eastern 
European modification rather than a full-fledged CME, it was chosen because unlike the Baltic area it 
displays some elements of  coordination. According to Bohle and Greskovits (2012: 260), “the Visegrád 
area embraced the socialist industrial legacy and qualified workforces as foundations for successful 
reindustrialization, and the paternalistic welfare institutions as a means to ´divide and pacify´ the feared 
opposition”. These countries embarked on less radical paths of  socially sensitive forms of  neoliberal 
capitalism. Ultimately, it is also believed that the categorical imperfections are compensated by the value 
of  extending VoC theory and dualization theory from largely Western Europe to CEE states. 
 
 4.2 Patterns of Dualization 
None of  the three countries has followed the liberal path and entirely deregulated their labour market 
institutions. Yet, there is a variety of  paths towards dualization by which local actors navigating within 
their country-specific institutional contexts have found functionally equivalent solutions to the common 
problem of  deregulation pressures (Palier 2005; Marx/ Eichhorst 2012). Moreover, the developments in 
Slovenia and Poland must be examined in the specific transformation context from ´existing socialism´ to 
capitalism during the 1990s and the consolidation of  their market economies and institutions in the 2000s. 
In order to better understand the context of  trade union strategies, the following sections briefly outline 




4.2.1 Germany as Dualization Prototype 
The breeding ground for dualization was provided by Western Germany´s post-war context, characterized 
by industrial manufacturing, “social corporatism“ (Urban 2014: 309), an employment regime of  
“organized time“ (Dörre 2009: 45) and relative class compromise enabled through high economic growth 
rates (cf. Sablowski 2004: 635; Castel 2005: 41ff.; Brinkmann et al. 2008: 26f.).8 The first cracks of  the 
employment model and influential calls for more liberalization emerged in the 1980s and became more 
pronounced after the German unification (cf. Haipeter/ Lehndorff  2014: 46). While LMEs and 
Scandinavian CMEs gave up on industry or invested in innovation (cf. Palier/ Thelen 2008: 5f.), in 
Germany early responses to the recessions in the 1980/90s were organized around saving manufacturing 
economy, “foundation for both the economic and the social model” (Palier/ Thelen 2010: 122). This was 
accomplished by increasing productivity (reducing size of  and intensifying work for the remaining 
industrial workforce) and outsourcing of  mainly low-skilled services (ibid.: 126). New types of  flexible, 
deregulated and often precarious jobs were created and contributed to the emergence of  a “second class 
labour market” (Brinkmann et al. 2008: 32). They were removed from manufacturing collective 
agreements and passed on to the weaker service sector unions. Consequently, the manufacturing core and 
the private service sector came to be governed by different institutional realities. The former continues to 
display established coordinated features, while the latter operates under conditions associated with LMEs 
(Haipeter 2011; Thelen 2012).  
In particular the strong manufacturing unions, which used to set the standards for the economy, are co-
responsible for this dualization. IGM is the central representative of  the industrial core workforce. Its 
leadership sat back watching the massive expansion of  precarious work and instead turned to cross-class 
coalitions and “competitive corporatism” since the 1990s (Urban 2014: 310). Company-level pacts for 
competition were increasingly negotiated with employers to secure the competitiveness of  the German 
business location and to protect the workplaces of  insiders (Palier/ Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014). The 
company-level concession bargaining during the 2008-2010 “crisis corporatism” to stabilize profits and 
protect a core of  workplaces from redundancy reinforced this dualization (Urban 2014: 30). Similarly, the 
government´s economic stimulus measures (short-time work schemes allowing for insider hoarding, car 
scrappage bonus), which were consulted with unions and employers before the adoption, protected 
insiders whereas outsiders were massively laid-off  (Glassner et al. 2011; Lehndorff  2011).9/10 Once 
economic growth kicked back in, companies employed even more flexible workers (cf. Dribbusch/ Birke 
2012: 16). 
                                                 
8 “Social corporatism” describes the negotiation of a relatively symmetrical class compromise by equally strong social 
  partners. The state acted as market-correcting welfare state and trade unions acted as distribution agent for all 
  workers. “Organized time” coins the idea of life-long, (initially 35-hours) 40-hours week employment and mostly 
  big enterprises.  
9 Short-time work was introduced during the crisis by many European countries. It implies a reduction of  working 
  time for a limited time, in Germany up to 24 months. During this period the employees receive compensation in 
  height of  the unemployment assistance instead of  the normal salary for the missing working hours. In return, they 
  keep their employment and the entitlements, which result from it.  
10  Glassner and Keune (2010) provide a list of emergency and employment packages. 
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Dualization was institutionalized and perpetuated in the course of  several labour law and social policy 
reforms by both social-democratic and conservative coalitions.11 Especially the Agenda 2010 and Hartz 
reforms of  the Red-Green government acted as major catalyst for an unprecedented degree of  labour 
market deregulation. The virtually complete deregulation of  agency work, the institutionalization of  
marginal employment through ´mini-jobs´ and the creation of  the publically subsidized ´one-Euro jobs´ 
systematically extended precariousness to large parts of  the population (cf. Palier/ Thelen 2010: 27ff.; 
Dribbusch/ Birke 2012: 9-10; Hassel 2014: 68f.).12 The reforms furthermore sharpened the line between 
contributions-based social insurance for insiders (unlikely to become unemployed for more than a year) 
and income-tested social assistance for outsiders for whom the state was asked to take responsibility (cf. 
Palier/ Thelen 2010: 37). This translated dualization into the realm of  social security. 
 
4.2.2 Slovenia´s Neo-Corporatist Transformation and Recent Dualization 
Slovenia could build on a wide array of  favourable legacies. It was the economically most developed 
Yugoslav Republic and most intensively connected with Western markets (cf. Bohle/ Greskovits 2012: 
452). It inherited high initial levels of  social welfare and for a long time provided the region´s most 
generous welfare system to mitigate transformation cost (ibid.: 139, 222). The long experience of  relatively 
autonomous self-management transferred participatory decision-making into the new institutional system 
and produced managers, unionists and bureaucrats, who appreciated coordinated relations (ibid. 2007: 
452). The uprising of  a powerful labour movement early into the transformation led to strong labour 
inclusion in the new institutional status quo and brought to power “leftist corporatism” (Obinger et al. 
2012: 195f.). Political exchange between a hegemonic centre-left government and strong organized 
economic interests (multi-employer associations and union confederations) became a permanent feature 
and the key mode of  interest concertation, which gave social legitimacy to market reforms (cf. Bohle/ 
Greskovits 2012: 261). Within the CEE region, Slovenia´s political elites adopted the least radical 
transformation path towards economic reconstruction and macroeconomic stabilization. Unlike the 
Visegrád and especially Baltic states, which quickly favoured foreign capital and promoted quick 
privatization, a strategic protectionism coordinated and limited early foreign takeover (ibid.: 192f., 203ff.). 
This reduced pressures to increase competitiveness and productivity through the creation of  a secondary 
labour market of  precarious work. Thus, during the 1990s the employment regime hardly changed and the 
standard employment model of  relative social security remained dominant (cf. Mrozowicki et al. 2013: 
268). 
                                                 
11 For an overview, see Palier and Thelen (2010: 27ff.), Birke (2011: 146f.), Eichhorst and Marx (2011: 74f.) and 
   Dribbusch and Birke (2012: 9f.).  
12 Mini-jobs refer to marginal, low-level, part-time work, which is not fully covered by social insurance contributions   
  (cf. Palier/ Thelen 2010: 128). One-Euro jobs were sold to the public as activation instrument for long-term 
   unemployed persons. Rather than providing a way back into standard employment, it created another form of 
   precarious employment without insurance entitlement and only limited labour law entitlements from which 
   employers profit (cf. Brinkmann et al. 2006: 34ff.). 
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Slovenia´s coordinated model has come under pressure since the mid-2000s, as “the swing of  the 
ideological pendulum brought a neoliberal breakthrough in transformation strategy” (Bohle/ Greskovits 
2012: 249). The EU and EMU accession (2004 and 2007) were accompanied by increasing pressures for 
competitiveness, deregulation and liberalization. In the run-up to the accessions, a series of  social pacts 
were negotiated by the social partners, which slowly but gradually introduced flexibility and austerity 
elements (cf. Stanojević 2010: 13ff.). Moreover, the centre-right government, which came to power in 
2004 after 12 years of  centre-left hegemony, initiated sweeping neoliberal reforms in 2006 to dismantle 
the coordinated institutional system. These implied not only changes in the labour code promoting the 
expansion of  atypical employment, but also trade union marginalization, welfare state and economic 
privatization (cf. Bohle/ Greskovits 2012: 249; Mrozowicki et al. 2013: 271). Many reforms failed, in part 
due to strong labour mobilization, and Prime Minister Janša´s disregard for social dialogue was punished 
in the 2008 elections. Yet, this period marks the emergence of  dualization tendencies (cf. Crowley/ 
Stanojević 2011: 284). It was however the crisis since 2008, which gave employers and the government the 
opportunity to accelerate these deregulation trends (cf. Mrozowicki et al. 2013: 269). These more recent 
and crisis-related developments are further discussed in chapter 5 with regards to union strategies.  
 
4.2.3 Poland´s Divide and Pacify Transformation 
Unlike Slovenia´s labour inclusive and shielded economic reconstruction, the Polish transformation is 
characterized by neoliberal shock therapy and ´divide and pacify´ social compromise policies. As 
mentioned before, organized labour was only weakly included into the new institutional order. This must 
be greatly attributed to the ideological division of  Solidarność and OPZZ as well as their turning away 
from unionism and focusing on political participation instead (Krzywdzinski 2009; Ost 2009; Trappmann 
2011a). Many unionists welcomed neoliberalism and radical liberalization programmes were implemented 
under the government participation of  Solidarność.13  
In contrast to the Baltic area´s low and Slovenia´s encompassing social welfare benefits, Poland provided 
strategically targeted benefits to groups of  workers, who had acquired a satisfactory social status in the 
socialist labour market (cf. Bohle/ Greskovits 2012: 152). In the face of  job destruction and rising labour 
market instability, these mostly better-educated and well-networked elderly workers were deemed to have 
the biggest capacity to mobilize against economic transformations. Especially the mining and steel 
industries received much attention by trade unions and politicians (cf. Spieser 2012: 9f.; Trappmann 2012: 
154ff.). An array of  particularistic exit schemes was negotiated, in particular generous early retirement 
schemes and disability pensions, which saved a lot of  from falling into poverty but also led to a costly 
                                                 
13
 A spectrum of right-conservative parties emerged from the Solidarność movement. OPZZ, successor of the state 
single trade union, participated in the foundation of the more social-democratic Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), 
which consisted of the reform-oriented rest of the communist party. Solidarność and OPZZ were for many years 
represented in the parliament and participated in government coalitions (Solidarność: 1990-1993; 1997-2001) (cf. 
Krzywdzinski 2009: 28f.). The ideological and political struggle between both confederations made cooperation 
almost impossible. As a result, the Forum FZZ was founded in 2002 as politically neutral confederation (cf. 
Trappmann 2011b: 2).  
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“great abnormal pensioner boom” (Vanhuysse 2006: 73).14 According to Vanhuysse (2006), these social 
compromise policies served to “divide and pacify” and to avoid disruptive violent protest during the 
socially costly transition.15  
Bohle and Greskovits (2007: 454) suggest that this “dual democratic” regime type allowed for the selective 
and limited inclusion of  some at the expense of  the remaining social actors, whose capacity for collective 
action was neutralized and disarticulated. Hence, dualization within the labour market, social policy and 
political representation was promoted throughout the transformation period. Like in Slovenia, labour 
policy came to be realigned in the course of  EU accession. Since 2002, an increase in so-called ´activating 
labour market policies´ implied a growth of  atypical forms of  employment and flexibilization of  
employment (cf. Trappmann 2012: 150ff.). The Polish trade unions promoted this institutional dualism. 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, they mobilized almost exclusively for the defence of  standard 
employment conditions or for favourable exit conditions when the declining industrial sectors, especially 
mining and steel, were affected. Conversely, they hardly ever lobbied for universal employment protection 
and social security or when new flexible forms of  work in non-traditional and non-strategic sectors were 
concerned (cf. Spieser 2012: 19).  
 
4.2.4 Dominant Deviations from Standard Employment 
With relatively low unemployment rates, outsiders in Germany, Slovenia and Poland must be located in 
atypical and in particular precarious forms of  employment (cf. OECD 2014a: n.p., appendix 4a).16 In 
Germany, part-time employment constitutes the biggest share of  atypical employment. It is significantly 
high amongst women (45 percent of  all women in the workforce in 2011; 9 percent of  men) (cf. Eurostat 
2013a: n.p., appendix 4c). Especially widespread and problematic are precarious marginal part-time jobs, for 
which the German tax and social security system offers considerable incentives (so-called mini-jobs) (cf. 
Haipeter/ Lehndorff  2014: 49). According to Haipeter and Lehndorff  (2014: 49) this segment now 
accounts for circa one fifth of  all employees. As argued earlier, there is a strong sector-bias: while more 
than 80 percent of  marginal employment can be found in the private service sector, only about 10 percent 
is in manufacturing (cf. Hassel 2014: 68). In the latter, temporary agency work has become increasingly 
popular. With the abolition of  its maximum term by the Hartz reforms, agency work rose from 330.000 to 
878.000 between 2003 and 2012 (cf. Dribbusch/ Birke 2014: 11). It accounts for between 30 percent and 
50 percent of  employees in some companies and thereby undermines the traditional company structure, 
                                                 
14 This “great abnormal pensioner boom” is manifest in the increase of  pensioners (including early retirement) by 46 
percent between 1989 and 1996 (Bohle/ Greskovits 2012: 155). Vanhuysse (2006: 74-88) provides extensive 
empirical data on welfare programmes in Poland. He shows for instance the large differences between welfare 
expenditures for families, unemployment and pensions: while the expenditure shares for pensions increased from 
circa 40 percent to 50 percent between 1990 and 1993, expenditures for families and unemployment remained below 
10 percent (ibid.: 80). 
15 Discontent was channelled into less disruptive forms, especially into anti-incumbency (cf. Vanhuysse 2006: 123, 
136). No incumbent government returned to office between 1990 and 2010.  
16 Unemployment is a greater topic for Southern European countries like Greece, Italy and Spain, where youth 
unemployment is particularly high (cf. OECD 2014a: n.p., appendix 4b). 
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according to which all persons working in a company are also employed by it. Agency work levers out 
structures of  interest representation and collectively agreed standards. It is not only used to overcome 
staff  shortage but to replace regular dependent employment in order to deviate from higher wages and to 
put pressure on permanent staff  (cf. Bispinck/ Schulten 2011: 10, 22; Gumbrell-McCormick 2011: 296).  
In Slovenia and Poland, the dominant form of  deviation from standard employment is fixed-term 
employment. In Slovenia it increased from 4 percent in 1996 (cf. Schmeißer et al. 2012: 134) to 17 percent 
in 2013 (cf. Eurostat 2013b: n.p., appendix 4d). In Poland, the share is even higher. This can inter alia be 
attributed to the 2009 anti-crisis legislation, which allowed for the conclusion of  an unlimited number of  
fixed-term contracts for a period of  up to 24 months (cf. Mrozowicki et al. 2013: 273). While only at circa 
12 percent in 2001, by the end of  2010 Poland had with 27 percent the highest share of  fixed-term 
contracts in the EU27 (average 14 percent) (cf. Pańków 2012: n.p.; Eurostat 2013b: n.p., appendix 4d). 
Problematic in both countries is the strong affectedness of  young people. In Slovenia, almost 75 percent 
(2011) of  15 to 24 year-old persons are employed on a fixed-term contract; this is the highest among all 
EU27 countries (average 42 percent in 2011) (cf. Guardiancich 2012: 106). In Poland, the prevalence is 
with 62 percent (2009) also highest in this age group and was only beaten by Slovenia (cf. Zieleńska 2012: 
n.p.). In both countries, the expansion of  atypical work accelerated during the crisis. Mrozowicki et al. 
(2013: 271) show how fixed-term work increased especially in the retail sector: in Slovenia from circa 12 to 
20 percent and in Poland from 7 to 34 percent between 2000 and 2011.  
Dualization in Slovenia and Poland is furthermore characterized by the striking growth of  new types of  
highly precarious contract work. In Slovenia, the high rate of  fixed-term employment among the youth is 
related to so-called ´student work´ managed by student employment agencies (cf. Kajzer 2013: n.p.). In 
Poland, ´civil law contracts´ are commonly used and together with fixed-term employment, they have 
come to be termed ´junk contracts´ (cf. Pańków 2012: n.p.). In 2010, approximately one-fifth of  all 
employees were active on the basis of  such a civil law contract (ibid.). Both types of  contract works are 
highly insecure and abuse-prone. They are very attractive for employers as they are cheaper and more 
flexible. They circumvent higher labour costs associated with minimum pay regulations, collective 
agreements binding for a respective sector and social security contributions. As they are not governed by 
labour law, these workers are excluded from minimum labour standards and basic social security rights.  
Moreover, in all three countries, dependent employment and the higher standards and costs associated 
with it, are increasingly circumvented by contracting out to bogusly solo-self-employed persons. Their 
poverty risk is rather low in Germany but high in Poland. In the latter, the precarious civil law contracts 
are often used for this and the lower tax wedge favoured their widespread diffusion (cf. Guardiancich/ 
Pliszkiewicz 2012: 80). Finally, low-wage employment and in-work poverty have increased in all three 
countries, with Germany at the forefront. Here, stagnating real wages, mini-jobs and government-
sponsored labour cheapening (e.g. one-Euro jobs; also short-time work) have resulted in the expansion of  
the low-wage sector to almost one-fourth of  all employees in 2010 - the second highest in Europe and 
closely followed by Poland (cf. IAB 2013: 1, 3, appendix 4e). Poland continues to have one of  the highest 
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in-work poverty rates in Europe (in 2007 with 11 percent the 2nd highest in the EU) (cf. Hanzl-Weiß et al. 
2010: 3). Finally, despite the existence of  a national minimum wage in Slovenia, the share of  low-wage 
work is also growing and was in 2010 with approximately 16 percent above the European average (15 
percent) (cf. IAB 2013: 3, appendix 4e).  
In sum, this chapter served to substantiate the discussion on dualization by examining the country-specific 
patterns and by locating the outsiders on the labour market.17 In Germany, deregulation and liberalization 
pressures must be traced back to the global economic crisis in the 1970s, the subsequent recessions and 
transformation of  the global production regime. Deregulation along the periphery of  the labour market 
therefore emerged earlier than in Poland and in particular Slovenia. Especially marginal, low-wage and 
agency work have pushed an increasing share of  the working population into poverty and precarity. 
Slovenia and Poland were thrown into a global context of  neo-liberal reconstruction and took different 
transformation paths. Dualization was “delayed in CEE countries, where standard full-time employment 
was […] the norm as a result of  their socialist legacy” (Mrozowicki et al 2013: 268). Unlike in Germany 
but like in many other peripheral European countries, the institutionalization and expansion of  precarious 
employment must be linked to the EU and EMU accession and liberalization and deregulation pressures 
exerted by the EU (cf. Trappmann 2012: 141). In Slovenia and Poland, fixed-term and new types of  
contract work are most problematic.  
The increasing affectedness of  young people by precarious employment underlines the new quality of  the 
current developments. Trade unions have contributed by privileging the protection of  their core 
constituencies instead of  lobbying for universal employment protection and standards. This is only true to 
some extent in Slovenia, where unions successfully mobilized against the Janša government´s neoliberal 
offensive (cf. Crowley/ Stanojević 2011: 284). The expansion of  the precarious margin pushing into the 
centre of  the labour market increasingly demands a rethinking in trade unions´ strategies. The subsequent 
chapter turns to analysing trade unions´ recent efforts to address these outlined groups of  outsiders. 
                                                 
17 The analysis is far from exhaustive. Bohle and Greskovits (2012) discuss in greater detail the impact of  particular 
socialist economic and political legacies on Slovenia´s and Poland´s institutional transformation. Moreover, the 
OECD´s Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and European Working Conditions Observatory (EWCO) 




5. Union Responses against the Expansion of Precarious Work 
Trade unions´ growing attention for labour market outsiders must be embedded into the greater debate on 
the ´crisis of  unionism´, which is held by scholars from both liberal and coordinated market economies 
(Frege/ Kelly 2004; Brinkmann et al. 2008; Birke 2010). Basing on the power resource approach by the 
Jena Working Group on Strategic Unionism, it can be argued that unions have since the 1980s/90s 
tremendously lost structural, organisational and institutional powers (cf. Wright 2000: 962; Silver 2005: 
30ff.; Brinkmann et al. 2008: 24ff.). Structural power, emerging from a particularly strategic position in the 
production process, has declined due to the expansion of  the post-industrial private service sector, which 
exhibits more liberal features such as flexible, replaceable workers without industry-specific skills (see 
chapter 2). This has undermined the respective unions´ capacity to directly impede the production process 
through strikes. Declining organisational power is manifest in the declining membership and union density 
rates, implying not only decreasing financial resources and mobilization potential but ultimately decreasing 
political weight and bargaining power. Institutional power, arising from unions´ inclusion through neo-
corporatist institutions, has partially become ineffective. This means that the fragmentation and 
undermining of  collective bargaining and social dialogue (see chapter 6) has increasingly limited the 
capacity of  trade unions to pose demands and negotiate improvements on wages and working conditions. 
Appendix 5 displays the decline of  trade union density and collective bargaining coverage.  
This loss of  power resources is closely related to the structural changes in the labour markets towards the 
growth of  post-industrial sectors characterized by flexible and frequently changing staff, higher 
competition, atomized workplaces and lower unionization (cf. Gumbrell-McCormick 2011: 299; Hassel 
2014: 62). Although some trade unions (private service sector) are earlier and more directly confronted 
with low power resources than others (manufacturing), “most have come to understand that the increase 
in atypical work undermines their power resources and weakens their capacity to act” (Bernaciak et al. 
2014: 4). Their increasing interest in the precarious margin is therefore motivated by a good portion of  
survival logic. The following sections highlight some of  the most noteworthy efforts undertaken by trade 
unions in the respective countries. 
 
5.1 Campaigning and Bargaining for Better Wages and Working Conditions  
      in Germany 
 
The publically most comprehensive and visible campaign in Germany has been the campaign against low 
wages and for a statutory national minimum wage. The debate was already initiated by the Food, 
Beverages and Catering Union (NGG) in 1999 and joint by ver.di in 2006; both increasingly too weak to 
secure higher wages through collective bargaining (cf. Palier/ Thelen 2010: 124f.; Dribbusch/ Birke 2014: 
24f.). Shortly afterwards, also the DGB adopted the demand. Since then, the DGB unions have, supported 
by the Left party, publically scandalized ´dumping wages´ and brought the demand for minimum wages on 
the political agenda. It is part of  a greater agenda of  the DGB since 2006, which propagates “good work” 
as counter-model against precarious work (Bispinck/ Schulten 2011: 35; Bernaciak et al. 2014: 17). On the 
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basis of  employee surveys, the DGB annually publishes the “good work index” with which it tries to 
influence the political debate and raise awareness for the deteriorating employment conditions (ibid.). 
With success: the introduction of  a national minimum wage was agreed in the 2013 coalition agreement 
of  the current SPD/CDU government.  
Except for the minimum wage campaign, most unions pursue their own strategies to address particular 
groups of  precarious workers, with which they are predominantly confronted. The most noteworthy shift 
in agenda of  IGM has been its continuous efforts to organize agency workers and the demand for equal 
wages as for core staff. Agency work strongly spread within IGM´s branches since 2003 and experienced 
another boom in the aftermath of  the 2008 economic and financial crisis (Dribbusch 2011a:). It became 
clear that the crumbling margin could become problematic for the union and the core workers, since 
agency work levers out collective agreements and the union´s influence over working conditions in a 
company. Consequently, it launched the “equal pay for equal work” campaign in 2008 to target agency 
workers, to raise public attention for their situation and to lobby for their interests in collective bargaining 
rounds (Dribbusch 2010: n.p.; Urban 2014: 313).18 Works councils were asked to approach agency workers 
and to jointly discuss their situation. The goal was to activate and involve them as well as to convince 
them to organize and struggle with the union for an improvement of  their situation (cf. Dribbusch/ Birke 
2014: 24ff.). Initially, numerous works agreements were concluded. The collective bargaining breakthrough 
was achieved in 2010 in the steel industry, where equal pay for agency workers was regulated for the first 
time in a collective agreement (cf. Dribbusch 2011b: n.p.; Lehndorff  2013: 194).19 Including agency 
workers in a collective bargaining agreement is an important first step towards including them under 
works councils´ competences, since they secure the agreement´s implementation (cf. interview Lehndorff). 
Moreover, on the basis of  this, agency workers could be granted a national minimum wage in 2012 (cf. 
Stettes 2012: n.p.).20 Another highlight according to Lehndorff  (interview) was that IGM made the re-
regulation of  agency work a top demand in last year´s bargaining round. In other words: outsider interests 
were expanded to a mobilization issue for all. This was an unprecedented mobilization regarding the issue 
of  agency work (cf. interview Lehndorff). By means of  this encompassing strategy which combined 
campaign- and collective bargaining elements, IGM succeeded in raising credibility amongst both insiders 
and outsiders. This is manifest in the unions´ organizing success: the number of  organized agency workers 
rose from 13.000 in 2010 to 44.000 in 2012 (cf. Urban 2014: 314).  
Most studies focus on the traditional insider union IGM. This is somewhat surprising, since it is ver.di, 
which is overwhelmingly confronted with precarious employment in the private service sector and low 
power resources. From its foundation in 2001 onwards, Ver.di has pursued an outsider-oriented agenda, 
which raises attention to the various facets of  precarious work. It has typically pursued public and 
                                                 
18 See also http://www.gleichearbeit-gleichesgeld.de/ (last accessed 17/06/2014). 
19 It must be mentioned that IGM chose the sector as pilot case, anticipating that employers were more likely to 
concede to this provision as wage levels for agency workers were already similar to those of  the core workers (cf. 
Bispinck/ Schulten 2011: 45). 
20 The Posted Workers Act provides for the possibility, that a collective bargaining agreement can be declared binding 
by the Federal Ministry of  Labour and Social Affairs. 
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relatively political campaigns either in the context of  or independent from collective bargaining (cf. 
interview Lehndorff). Its campaign in the supermarket chain Lidl since 2004 for instance targeted the 
precarity of  the mostly female employees and the widespread use of  intimidation tactics by employers (cf. 
Brinkmann et al. 2008: 120ff.). In the “health is not a commodity” campaign in 2008, ver.di tried to 
prevent the privatization of  Hamburg´s state hospitals with a larger coalition from civil society (Greer 
2008).21 In 2013/4, in the context of  bargaining rounds in the retail sector and at the Charité hospital in 
Berlin, ver.di scandalized the increasing work intensification, flexibilization of  work schedules and the 
expansion of  low-wage and agency work. At the Charité, ver.di and works councils fought for almost one 
year for the introduction of  a minimum staff  quota (ver.di 2014). This demand was innovative and 
assertive as it tried to introduce workload as new element into collective bargaining and demanded 
involvement in the hospital´s economic and administrative matters. The campaign under the slogan ´more 
of  us is better for everyone´ stressed the broader negative consequences of  precarious care work for 
patients (ibid.).22 However, the fact that Verdi could not secure significant achievements through collective 
bargaining comparable to IGM´s equal pay agreement underlines its weaker bargaining position (interview 
Lehndorff). 
Both ver.di and IGM have put efforts into developing innovative revitalization strategies to overcome the 
dwindling power resources. IGM has increasingly placed emphasis on and shifted resources towards 
developing organizing perspectives, which address and activate groups of  workers in branches and 
companies typically underrepresented (Wetzel et al. 2011). Ver.di has earlier and more comprehensively 
than IGM pursued organizing campaigns, which not only seek to recruit and activate precarious workers 
and promote the creation of  works councils, but which also raise broader political questions. To this end, 
ver.di has unlike IGM pursued close cooperation with NGOs, social movements or other civil society 
groups (Brinkmann et al. 2008; Greer 2008; Birke 2010; Wetzel et al. 2011). A noteworthy example is the 
2006 campaign to organize security guards in Hamburg for which ver.di cooperated with the North-
American Service Employees’ International Union (SEIU) (cf. Dribbusch 2010: n.p.; Birke 2011: 161).23 
During the disputes in the retail sector and at the Charité in Berlin, ver.di tried to strengthen its structural 
and organisational power by organizing local support from political activists and persons affected such as 
patients or consumers.24 The group of  self-employed has also been placed high on ver.di´s agenda. Its 
separate consulting firm “Mediafon” offers direct support and has become an important recruiting 
instrument (Bispinck/ Schulten 2011: 48).  
                                                 
21 Greer (2008) assesses the cooperation of  ver.di with civil society groups as first instance of  “social movement 
unionism” in Germany. This is another concept from the revitalization studies and draws on insights from the joint 
social and political struggles of  civil society and trade unions in the Global South, in particular South Africa and the 
Philippines (cf. Brinkmann et al. 2008: 84f.; Birke 2010: 89ff.). 
22 The insights stem from personal participation in the supporting coalition. In June 2014, an agreement was 
concluded, which observers perceive critical (cf. Behruzi 2014: n.p.). 
23 SEIU has played a significant role in the development of  revitalization strategies in the US. Its´ “Justice for 
Janitors” campaign is reference point for many European trade unions (Brinkmann et al. 2008: 87). 
24 A recent example is the organizing ´Blitz´ in shops of  the clothing company H&M in Berlin. Unionized H&M 
employees, ver.di members and supporters disseminated in small groups on a strike day to talk to non-striking 
workers and strike breakers about their working conditions and to make them aware of  their right to strike.  
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In sum, IGM and ver.di have lobbied for the re-regulation of  precarious work and for improving 
outsiders´ working and living conditions. They have successfully campaigned for some major policy 
projects, such as the introduction of  a statutory minimum wage and equal pay for agency workers. These 
campaigns have been underpinned by organizing efforts on the company level and by placing the issue of  
precarious work in collective bargaining rounds. Regarding the latter, IGM has been far more successful 
than ver.di. This must greatly be attributed to the dualized institutional regimes under which both unions 
operate. 
 
5.2 Negotiating Security and Fighting Flexibility in Slovenia 
While the sector level has been a major venue for Germany´s unions to address precarious work, in 
Slovenia no significant strategies or campaigns have been pursued at this level (cf. interview Lukič). 
Instead, sector- and company-level collective bargaining have focused on insider protection; this is on 
preserving rights and the level of  protection rather than on introducing demands that address outsiders 
(cf. Bernaciak et al. 2014: 5). Lukič (interview) names the metalworking sector as exception, where the 
well-organized respective union managed to guarantee the transition of  workers from fixed-term to 
permanent employment through a collective agreement. Except for this, precarious work has been 
predominantly addressed on the national level by the trade union confederations. They however proved to 
be very successful as they contributed to tipping government reforms that would have significantly 
expanded precarious work. 
Early into the crisis in 2008 under the social democratic Pahor government, the social partners negotiated 
an anti-crisis package in the national tripartite Economic and Social Council (ESS), which entailed poverty 
alleviation measures and greater spending on most social transfers (cf. Guardiancich 2012: 107).25 
However, the crisis did not abate but hit Slovenia hard. In addition, pressure by the EU and OECD to 
introduce austerity measures and labour market reforms increased (ibid.: 111). The government pressed 
ahead and crafted a number of  reforms on which social dialogue ultimately collapsed. Amongst those, it 
was especially the reforms on minimum wage, mini-jobs and pensions, which were highly opposed by 
Slovenia´s union confederations. They made these issues a priority on their agenda and launched country-
wide campaigns; with some outstanding results. 
Regarding the “Minimum Wage Act”, the unions addressed not only the final amount but also whether it 
would be tied to other more flexibility-oriented reforms of  the government´s reform package (ibid.: 112). 
In autumn 2009, the confederations, backed by student and pensioner movements, staged mass protests in 
Ljubljana with some 30.000 demonstrators. They demanded the immediate increase of  the minimum wage 
and threatened to interrupt all social dialogue. As several structural reforms were negotiated at that time 
(pensions, Mini-Jobs Act, Employment Relationship Act) the government gave in to the confederations´ 
                                                 
25 The temporary anti-crisis measures were relatively generous and included for instance an increase of  the national 
minimum wage, special supplements for socially vulnerable groups or higher unemployment benefits (cf. 
Guardiancich 2012: 107ff.). 
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threat. The National Assembly approved the Minimum Wage Act in January 2010 with the higher level 
and disconnected from the other reforms, as demanded by the confederations (ibid.: 112f.).  
The second and probably most impressive initiative was the campaign in 2010 against the “Mini-Jobs Act” 
(ibid.: 113). After no compromise could be found in the ESS, the government unilaterally sent it together 
with two other reform proposals to the National Assembly where it was approved in October 2010 
(Skledar 2011a).26 The Act provided for the introduction of  a new type of  marginal fixed-term 
employment aimed at students, unemployed, retired and other inactive persons. The union confederations 
feared that institutionalizing such form of  employment would promote work without workers´ rights and 
gradually oust regular forms of  employment (ibid.). They requested information on the effects of  this 
type of  employment from the DGB and German labour market experts (cf. interview Lukič). Their 
results underlined the precarious potential of  mini-jobs and helped to turn public opinion against them. 
Together with student groups, they organized some of  the largest protests since the independence of  
Slovenia (cf. Lužar 2013: n.p.). The Student Organisation of  Slovenia initiated a national referendum, 
which the confederations supported. Collecting over one million signatures, the referendum was granted 
and took place in April 2011. The result was memorable: the Mini-Jobs Act was defeated with 80 percent 
of  votes rejecting the new law (cf. Skledar 2011b: n.p.). Similarly, a triple referendum was held in June 
2011 and struck down three other vital laws of  the reform project, including the centrepiece pension 
reform raising the retirement age and pension qualifying period. Thus, the confederations took up a 
decisive role in averting the government´s neoliberal offensive by pushing for security elements (minimum 
wage; Labour Market Regulation Act extending unemployment rights) and striking down elements of  
flexibilization (mini-jobs). Their campaigns raised public awareness for precarious work and the 
importance of  quality rather than exclusively quantity of  jobs. 
The Pahor government collapsed over the defeated reforms and a centre-right government came to power 
in 2012. Having experienced their sanctioning potential, the Janša government restored social dialogue and 
the confederations have returned to the negotiation table since then. Between 2012 and 2013, the social 
partners negotiated changes in the labour code to reduce the ´rigidity´ of  permanent employment and 
tighten the rules on fixed-term employment (cf. Curtarelli et al. 2013: 13; interview Lukič). Although 
having had to accept some concessions (e.g. lower severance pay for permanent workers), the 
confederations succeeded in preserving some basic protection for outsiders, such as the introduction of  
severance pay for fixed-term work and access to unemployment benefits for two months for people under 
30 after six months of  formally recognized work experience (cf. Skledar 2013a: n.p.; interview Lukič). It 
remains to be seen whether, as hoped by the confederations, this will encourage the use of  permanent 
instead of  fixed-term contracts and overcome the increasing dualization between both.  
                                                 
26
 The “Labour Market Regulation Act” was less controversial as it extended protection rights for unemployed 
persons, such as eligibility and fruition of  unemployment benefits (Guardiancich 2012: 115). It is now in force. The 
“Employment Relationship Act” was supposed to be bound to the Labour Market Regulation Act and increase the 
flexibility of  individual dismissals (ibid.). It was quietly withdrawn not due to failed agreement but inadequacy which 
shall not be further discussed at this point.  
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Finally, recruiting and activating new groups of  workers has also entered unions´ agendas since the crisis. 
However, organizing strategies are quite diffuse and largely left to company unions (cf. Lužar 2010: n.p.; 
Mrozowicki 2014: 7f.). Only ZSSS, the largest confederation with more resources at its disposal, takes a 
more centrally-led and proactive organizing approach offering solutions and simultaneously gaining more 
members (cf. Lužar 2010: n.p.; interview Lukič). ZSSS cooperates for instance with the Student 
Organisation of  the University of  Ljubljana and participates at their yearly “Student Arena” (Lužar 2010: 
n.p.). By providing career coaching and raising awareness for the advantages of  union membership, the 
goal is to become publicly more accepted and break the stereotype of  unions being “male, pale and stale” 
(interview Lukič). ZSSS also created the special trade union "Young plus" for persons under the age of  35 
to organize young people, to provide them with an own platform and to encourage them to become 
actively involved in unionism (Lužar 2013: n.p.). Furthermore, ZSSS also started to target migrant workers 
in 2007 by offering legal advice through counselling offices and info points throughout the country (cf. 
interview Lukič). With some success: “there is evidence that more migrant workers are aware of  their 
rights and are turning to ZSSS for help” (Lužar 2010: n.p.). 
In sum, in Slovenia labour market dualization and precarious work have almost exclusively been addressed 
at the national level by the union confederations. They have mainly tackled these issues within the ESS. 
But for a brief  period, when social dialogue was disregarded by the government, they also assertively 
campaigned outside of  the ESS. Organizing efforts are in general in the early stage, but efforts by ZSSS 
are showing first successes. 
 
5.3 Political Activism against Junk Contracts in Poland 
The withdrawal of  Solidarność and OPZZ from party politics and emergence of  a generation of  
unionists growing up under the hardships of  neoliberalism and perceiving unions as chance rather than 
useless impediment led to the ´re-emergence´ of  somewhat like an organized labour movement since the 
mid-2000s (Ost 2009; Krzywdzinski 2009; Trappmann 2011b). Since then, OPZZ, Solidarność and the 
smaller FZZ have targeted outsiders not only more frequently but also more vehemently. They were 
remarkably successful in highlighting the problem of  precarious problem and labelled the term “junk 
contracts”, which was picked up by the public discourse (Bernaciak et al. 2014: 6; interviews Czarzasty and 
Mrozowicki). The confederations have increasingly opposed government policies, such as pension and 
labour market reforms in 2012 and 2013, which they accuse of  externalizing crisis costs to the whole 
society and of  using the crisis as excuse to flexibilize and extent precarious work (Mrozowicki et al. 2013; 
Czarzasty 2013). They have repeatedly criticized the disregard of  social dialogue and have demanded 
negotiation on junk contracts in Poland´s Tripartite Council (TC), the introduction of  obligatory 
contributions to the social security and pension systems for all forms of  employment (including the very 
precarious civil law contracts) as well as the regulation of  temporary work to avoid the abuse of  social 
security rules (cf. Curtarelli et al. 2013: 64). 
According to Pańków (2012: n.p.), the union confederations became radicalised over the issue of  junk 
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contracts in the course of  the elections in 2011, when the main coalition party, the Civic Platform, 
announced Labour Code amendments to include measures on renewable seasonal contracts. Solidarność 
launched a campaign against the expansion of  junk contracts in 2012, inter alia providing an online, 
interactive “junk contracts map” and promoting research on the issue (ibid.). The campaign attracted 
support by celebrities from the media, sports and politics. FZZ launched the “Commission Contract 
Generation” campaign in 2011 together with a grassroots organisation of  young people to draw attention 
to the high vulnerability of  young workers and to provide advisory structures (Trawinska 2011a: n.p.). The 
first visible highlight was the Euro-demonstration in 2011 in Wroclaw - the biggest union demonstration 
in Poland since 1989 with 20.000 to 50.000 participants - where the term junk contracts constituted a 
central theme (ibid. 2011b: n.p.). 
The level of  protest steadily increased since 2012, when the Tusk government unilaterally passed a 
pension reform and provoked unions´ unanimous opposition by disregarding social dialogue. In summer 
2012, the three confederations organized numerous protests against the raising of  retirement age, the 
expansion of  junk contracts and the lack of  social dialogue. They set up protest camps, held 
demonstrations and advertised their campaign through websites and in the nationwide media. Moreover, 
they collected almost three times more than necessary signatures for a national referendum (cf. 
Mrozowicki 2012: n.p.). Despite these massive protests the government unilaterally passed the pension 
reform to the parliament, which accepted it in June 2012. Social dialogue reached another stalemate, as a 
result of  which the three confederations moved closer together (Curtarelli et al. 2013; Czarzasty/ 
Mrozowicki 2013). They became more assertive and showed surprisingly high mobilization potential. In 
March 2013, the three confederations and two other trade unions organized the first general strike with 
85.000 workers in Silesia (cf. Mrozowicki 2013: n.p.).27 A climax was reached in June 2013, when the 
confederations jointly decided to suspend participation in the TC in protest of  changes to the labour code 
by the government without consultation (cf. Gardawski 2014: n.p.). In this context, they organized the 
largest national street protest in decades with approximately 100.000 people; “an unprecedented concerted 
union action” (Czarzasty 2014: n.p.).28  
Despite the increasing institutional marginalization of  the confederations, their highly visible actions 
raised public support for them. According to Gardawski (2014: n.p.), “for the first time since 1989, unions 
were perceived to be expressing the concerns of  all Polish workers, not just their own members”. Both 
interviewees assess the new political activism with which the union confederations jointly campaign for 
the interests of  those most vulnerable on the labour market as remarkable. Ten years ago, unionism was 
characterized by political rivalry and the phenomenon of  precarious work was not much of  a topic in 
public discourse. Today, the outlined concerted actions have succeeded in making the issue of  precarious 
work publically visible and shifted the discussion from “having any job and fighting unemployment to the 
quality of  jobs” (interview Mrozowicki). This is reflected in public statistics: the newest labour statistics 
                                                 
27 Mrozowicki (interview) comments that the strike was rather symbolic as it was held so early in the morning that it 
did not cause much economic harm. 
28 It must be stressed that this emerging anti-government protest movement is politically diffuse and embraces right-
wing nationalist and conservative forces as well as left movements and organisations.  
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for 2012 (out in January 2014) provide data on the number of  people working on civil law contracts for 
the very first time (cf. interview Czarzasty). Furthermore, the fact that the government is now working on 
a new legislation regarding social security contributions for all workers is the result of  unions´ 
mobilization.29 Mrozowicki (interview) believes that “the government and Prime Minister would not talk 
about junk contracts if  unions had not followed this kind of  agenda; so this is a sign of  effectiveness of  
union action.”  
The second principal outsider-oriented initiative on the confederations´ agenda has been to expand full 
workers´ rights to self-employment and civil law contracts. Both statuses are currently not covered by the 
Polish Trade Unions Act, which according to the confederations contradicts the ILO Convention 87 and 
98 and the Freedom to Assemble guaranteed in the Polish Constitution (cf. ILO 2012: n.p.). OPZZ and 
Solidarność demand that all ´employee-like´ persons should be granted the same comprehensive rights 
and be able to unionize (cf. Trappmann 2011a: 15). Solidarność filed a complaint to the ILO in 2011, 
which was approved and resulted in recommendations to the Polish government (ILO 2012). Similarly, 
OPZZ complained to the Constitutional Court of  Poland to review the Trade Unions Act (cf. Trappmann 
2011a: 15). The result is still pending.  
Aside from these two key initiatives, labour market outsiders have been targeted through organizing 
campaigns. Like in Slovenia, the confederations dispose over few resources for organizing and mostly 
leave this to the company unions.30 Solidarność has however “uniquely in CEE, systematically adopted the 
American organizing approach” and similar to ver.di, there have been contacts between Solidarność and 
the SEIU (Krzywdzinski 2010: 277). In 1999 it created the Union Development Office (UDO), through 
which it conducted some major organizing campaigns of  security guards, in large super-and hypermarkets 
as well as in the automotive industry (Krzywdzinski 2010; Trawinska 2012; Mrozowicki et al. 2013, 2014). 
In the security sector, Solidarność carried out a nationwide organizing campaign to build up an inter-
company organisation in Warsaw, organizing 4.000 people (of  circa 26.000 employees) from eight security 
companies by 2008 and completing frame contracts with six of  these companies (cf. Krzywdzinski 2009: 
33f.). In super-and hypermarkets, a number of  company unions were established, organizing circa 5.000 
members (of  circa 150.000 employees) (ibid.). Solidarność´s campaigns also succeeded in negotiating pay 
increases and transforming temporary into permanent jobs (e.g. Kaufland campaign 2010) (cf. Mrozowicki 
et al. 2013: 274). Moreover, Solidarność used mass media to disseminate and publicize the working 
conditions in super- and hypermarkets. In 2011 it launched a webpage “hyper-exploitation”, which allowed 
retail sector employees to anonymously voice their concerns over employment conditions in their 
companies (ibid.).31 There are also noteworthy organizing activities in the regional structures, in particular 
campaigns targeting automotive companies (cf. Krywdzinski 2010: 283).  
                                                 
29 The government proposed to introduce obligatory social security payment for civil law contracts to the pension 
fund but not to health security. Mrozowicki (interview) states that this should be unacceptable for unions. 
30 OPZZ seeks to organize precarious workers through its member union “Confederation of  Labour” (Krzywdzinski 
2010: 287). According to Mrozowicki (interview), it failed however to develop into a trans-sectoral union within 
OPZZ in part because of  opposition of  smaller unions´ leaders who perceived it as competition.  
31 Homepage available under http://hiperwyzysk.pl/handel/ (last accessed 17/06/2014). 
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In sum, Poland´s confederations have assertively pursued an outsider-oriented agenda, which introduced 
the issue of  junk contracts in the public and political debate and made this precarious work visible 
through campaigns and mobilizations. They have also advocated for expanding full labour rights to self-
employed or civil law workers. Furthermore, Solidarność has launched some impressive and successful 
organizing campaigns. 
 
5.4 Summary of Observations: Differences within Similarities 
One should not be overly enthusiastic and interpret this increased attention for precarious workers as step 
towards the romantic Marxist idea of  trade unions serving as organizing centres for the working class and 
lobbying for societal transformation. Often, unions´ strategies have been much more controversial than 
could be presented in this limited overview. Tensions between rank and file unionists, works councils and 
a structurally conservative leadership are excluded from the discussion. Similarly, everyday running 
business and location policy, which continues to promote dualization, are excluded too. Nevertheless, the 
previous analysis allows for the conclusion that trade unions in all three countries have during the last ten 
years become aware of  the problem constituted by the expansion of  non-standard and particularly 
precarious work and have started to address it. Ten years ago they focused almost exclusively on their 
traditional core business with organized insiders in mostly industrial or public sectors. Most of  the 
respective unions did not recognize the problem, not even to speak of  making it their political practice. 
Secondly, while a tendency towards the greater use of  public campaign and organizing strategies can be 
observed in all cases, a closer inspection reveals important peculiarities. For instance, Poland shows almost 
exclusively political activism and public campaigning at the national level. Furthermore, country-specific 
problems such as the exclusion of  particular groups of  workers from unionism are high on the agenda. To 
the contrary, mobilization and public campaigning only briefly flamed up in Slovenia and quickly returned 
into the institutionalized arenas of  especially social dialogue. Outsiders are hardly addressed in sector-level 
collective bargaining in Slovenia. In Germany conversely, precarious work is, except for the minimum 
wage campaign, predominantly addressed at the sector level. Here, strategies differ between the different 
sector unions, reflecting the dualization between the core manufacturing and outsider service sector. In 
Poland and Slovenia, the confederations´ opposition against the deregulation of  employment is 
accompanied by a more fundamental political dispute with the governments. In Germany, it seems that 
disputes rather centre on the relationship with employers. Finally, organizing practices have entered the 
agendas of  unions in all three countries. However, they diverge in comprehensiveness and quality. 
Solidarność and ver.di seem to have developed comprehensive organizing campaigns, which are informed 
by the North-American experiences. The organizing efforts of  IGM and ZSSS seem more recent, more 
membership-oriented and more strongly embedded in the local context.  
Variance might have been expected in Poland, the weaker case in the comparison due to the presence of  
more liberal features and weak neo-corporatism. Differences in union responses between and within the 
two similar neo-corporatist cases of  Germany and Slovenia were not to be expected on the basis of  VoC 
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theory and would have remained invisible by its focus on inter-regime variety. This reconfirms the 
importance of  taking a closer look at the variation within similar institutional regimes. In the words of  
Eichhorst and Marx (2012: 95) “variation [in union strategies] is best understood if  country-specific 
institutional constraints are included in the analysis as well as the creative (and destructive) behaviour of  
economic actors to overcome such constraints”. The next chapter examines the particularities within the 
industrial relations of  Germany, Slovenia and Poland.  
 
6.The Varieties of Industrial Relations 
Industrial relations regimes give direction to the actions of  trade unions and to a great degree impact their 
opportunity structures. In other words, they define the stable or non-stable characteristics of  the 
institutional system, which shape their power resources and affect the conditions, which impinge on their 
strategic decisions (cf. Della Porta/ Diani 2006: 17; Glassner/ Keune 2010: 5). VoC theory attributes great 
importance to such institutional frameworks and assumes that local actors act by them and thereby 
reproduce them. As mentioned in Chapter 4, CMEs are assumed to regulate their labour relations through 
corporation, coordination and negotiation. Neo-corporatist institutions of  collective bargaining and social 
dialogue include organized labour into the national institutional system and thereby provide institutional 
power to them to directly impact the conditions on the labour market. However, the previous chapter 
posed the question as to what extent differences in union strategies even within coordinated industrial 
relations systems can be linked to country-specific institutional arrangements. Therefore, this chapter 
points out to finer differences, which are ignored by an exclusive focus on inter-regime variety. Thereby, it 
is believed that examining solely the formally fixed institutional arrangements provides an insufficient 
picture. As outlined in chapter 3, it is vital to understand institutions as dynamic and contested. 
Established power relations were challenged during the last decades and these dynamics regained 
momentum in the context of  the recent global economic and financial crisis. This chapter first compares 
the industrial relations systems and thereafter examines the recent developments underlying the formal 
institutional frameworks. 
 
6.1 Industrial Relations Regimes in Comparison 
6.1.1 Centralized versus Decentralized Collective Bargaining 
The industrial relations of  Germany and Slovenia must be located on the centralized side of  the 
continuum. To begin with, the obvious similarities may be pointed out. The strong system of  sector-level 
collective bargaining between single trade unions and multi-employer associations to set pay and working 
conditions as well as the co-determination rights of  works councils constitute important institutional 
anchors of  union influence in both systems (cf. Lehndorff  2013: 189; Skledar 2013b: 6, 11). Collective 
agreements count for all employers that are members of  the signing employer-association and embrace all 
their employees. Similar extension mechanisms allow for a collective agreement to be extended by the 
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Minister of  Labour to the entire industry (cf. Skledar 2013b: 6f.). As a result, the collective bargaining 
coverage rates are relatively high in both countries. In Germany, the coverage through collective 
agreements was at 61 percent in 2010 (cf. ICTWSS 2013: n.p.; Bernaciak et al. 2014: 1, appendix 5). In 
Slovenia, circa 92 percent of  all employees were covered in 2009 (ibid.).32 This high coverage rate must be 
linked to the fact that until 2005, almost 100 percent of  employers were organized due to compulsory 
membership in the Chamber of  Commerce (cf. Crowley/ Stanojević 2011: 273). 
Even though Germany´s and Slovenia´s industrial relations are traditionally very coordinated on the sector 
level, there are a number of  particularities as regards the union landscape and allocation of  institutional 
power. The strength of  the German industrial relations lie in the existence of  industry-wide organized, 
large and single trade unions, which enjoy a great degree of  autonomy and concentrate institutional power. 
The German trade unions have traditionally been organised on an industry basis, but through merges 
many have developed into “multi-branch unions” (Dribbusch/ Birke 2012: 2).33 The largest single unions 
are IGM and ver.di. In Slovenia, single unions are not only organized on an industry basis but also on the 
basis of  region, profession or individual status (e.g. unions for pensioners and young people) (cf. 
Guardiancich/ Pliszkiewicz 2012: 98f.). In Germany, these single unions are organized in three main 
confederations, of  which the DGB with its eight member unions is the principal one. In Slovenia, there 
are eight confederations at the national level, of  which the ZSSS is by far the largest (cf. Guardiancich/ 
Pliszkiewicz 2012: 98f.).34 ZSSS alone affiliates twenty-two single unions. The union landscape on the 
sector level is thus more fragmented than in Germany. Moreover, while the DGB only holds 
representative and political power, Slovenia´s confederations are also vested with institutional power 
through tripartite bargaining (see. 6.1.2.). In Germany, only the single trade unions have the right to 
collective bargaining and to organize labour disputes. They thereby concentrate institutional power and 
conflicts on working conditions are largely kept at the sector level between the unions and the employers´ 
associations. 
Since Poland was identified as mixed case, it comes as no surprise that it differs in many respects to the 
German and Slovenian cases. With respect to bipartite bargaining, its industrial relations must be located 
at the decentralized side of  the continuum. Even though Poland had one of  the strongest labour 
movements in Europe, organized labour was weakly institutionalized in the new capitalist system.35 
Collective bargaining is highly decentralized and mostly takes place at the company level between single-
employers and company unions (cf. Gardawski et al. 2012: 23). A country-specific institutional feature is 
the provision that a union can be founded in every company with more than ten employees. As a result, a 
                                                 
32 Data embraces both the public and private sector. Examining only the private sector, the bargaining coverage was 
at 58 percent in Germany (2010) and 90 percent in Slovenia (2009) (cf. ICTWSS 2013: n.p.). Data for Slovenia in 
appendix 5 is missing.  
33 Ver.di and IG BCE (mining, chemicals and energy) are good examples for multi-branch unions.  
34 ZSSS organizes with the “Confederation of  Public Sector Trade Unions” (KSJS) and “Pergam” roughly 90 percent 
of  Slovenia´s union members (cf. Guardiancich/ Pliszkiewicz 2012: 98f.). 
35 The reasons are diverse and include the political and ideological cleavage between Solidarność and OPZZ, the 
welcoming of  neo-liberalism by especially Solidarność and strong identity of  skilled craftsmen. For an elaborate 
discussion, see for instance Krzywdzinksi (2009) and Ost (2009).  
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myriad of  company unions exist. The extreme fragmentation makes multi-company collective bargaining 
difficult. Moreover, in large companies often several unions must negotiate, which may be a challenge.36 
While negotiations could be facilitated by allowing one union to gain “representativeness”, “competitive 
pluralism” has impeded the development of  further-reaching bargaining structures (ibid.: 19, 37).37 
Consequently, noteworthy company collective agreements are rare (cf. Trappmann 2011b: 3; interview 
Czarzasty).  
Aside from promoting union fragmentation, the legal requirement of  ten (dependent) employees to create 
a union makes it impossible for workers in Poland´s many micro-companies with less than ten employees 
to form or join a company union (cf. interview Czarzasty). Furthermore, unlike for instance in Germany, 
unemployed, pensioners, students and self-employed workers are not eligible neither and thus virtually 
excluded from unionization too. The extremely low trade union density of  14 percent in 2010 must be 
considered against this background (cf. Bernaciak et al. 2014: 1, appendix 5).38 Similarly, in comparison to 
Slovenia´s and Germany´s high coverage rates, only 29 percent of  employees were covered by collective 
agreements in 2010 (ibid.).39 More generally, all three countries have in common that the collective 
bargaining coverage is generally higher and trade union organisation stronger in manufacturing than in the 
private services (cf. Glassner et al. 2011: 317). This reflects the translation of  labour market dualization 
into the industrial relations. 
 
6.1.2 Strong versus Illusory Social Dialogue 
Aside from collective bargaining, tripartite negotiations between the social partners (state, employers and 
trade unions) constitute another important pillar of  neo-corporatist industrial relations institutions. Here, 
the three countries differ considerably. In Germany, tripartite concertation is found in the social security 
system and its institutions (e.g. statutory unemployment, health, pension insurance). There are several 
committees (e.g. vocational training) or initiatives (e.g. “Coalition for Work, Training and Competitiveness” 
by the Red-Green coalition in 1998; “Konjunkturgipfel” during the crisis) featuring tripartite structures. 
However, there is no national pact and council institutionalizing tripartite concertation like in Slovenia and 
Poland (cf. Vogel 2013: 8).  
This is a crucial difference between the German and Slovenian industrial relations regimes. Institutional 
power in Slovenia is not only concentrated in sector-level collective bargaining, but also on the national 
level of  tripartite negotiations through the eight confederations. Slovenia stands out as the only CEE 
country with a fully functioning system of  social dialogue, deserving of  the neo-corporatist label (cf. 
                                                 
36 Trappmann (2011b: 5) illustrates this on the example of the coal company Kompania Węglowa, which has circa 
63.000 employees and 177 single unions (status 2011).  
37 For elaboration on the representativeness criteria at the local and national level, see Gardawski et al. (2012: 23).  
38 Because most employees in companies were without union representation, works councils were introduced in 2006 
in the course of  an EU-Directive and became mandatory for companies with more than 50 employees (cf. Bernaciak 
et al. 2014: 12). Unlike in Germany and Slovenia, these have however only an informative and consultative function 
and trade unions continue to represent the major institutional form of  employee interest representation. 
39 Most existing agreements often only repeat existing labour law (cf. interview Czarzasty). 
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Crowley/ Stanojević 2011: 273). The ESS at least once a month brings together representatives from the 
government, employers and the national union confederations to deal with a range of  labour and social 
issues (cf. Skledar 2013b: 10). It has an advisory function and the National Assembly traditionally only 
discusses socio-economic legislation that was debated by the social partners in the ESS. It also plays an 
active part in the preparation of  legislation by cooperating in their drafting and giving recommendations 
(cf. Guardiancich/ Pliszkiewicz 2012: 100). Moreover, the ESS has a “quasi-bargaining function”, 
negotiating almost every year “social pacts” (Skledar 2013b: 10). These have a long tradition in Slovenia 
and specify the partners´ mutual obligations, including prospective reforms, which are crucial to set the 
agenda for an incumbent government (cf. Guardiancich/ Pliszkiewicz 2012: 101; Bernaciak et al. 2014: 
13). 
In Poland, unionism on the company level was shown to be extremely fragmented and collective 
bargaining decentralized. At the same time, like in Slovenia social dialogue is institutionalized at the 
national level. Political and institutional power must thus be attributed to Solidarność, OPZZ and FZZ.40 
Only they are considered as nationally representative confederations and as such participate in the TC.41/42 
In the face of  extreme fragmentation, these three nationally organized, encompassing multi-sector 
confederations can be considered as the main organisational pillars of  the contemporary union movement 
in Poland as they affiliate three-quarter of  all company unions (cf. Trappmann 2011b: 2). Like in Slovenia, 
the TC plays an advisory role and should be consulted on legislation concerning the labour market, state 
benefits and employment rights. The social partners can also reach tripartite “social agreements” and set 
the minimum wage within its framework (Czarzasty/ Mrozowicki 2013: 11). However, the fundamental 
difference to Slovenia is that social dialogue has not been consolidated and is structurally weak (Ost 2000; 
Avdagic 2005; Gardawski/ Meardi 2010; Bohle/ Greskovits 2012). Since its foundation there has been a 
persistent disregard of  the social partners´ opinion by the government. “Only when the governing 
coalitions [faced] critical circumstances […] which required broader societal legitimation, there were some 
sporadic […] attempts for forging tripartite social pacts” (Guardiancich/ Pliszkiewicz 2012: 71).43 Thus, 
while neo-corporatist institutions are formally in place in Poland, their actual impact is limited and 
described as “illusory” (Ost 2000: 503) or “PR-corporatism” (Bernaciak et al. 2014: 21). Pollert (1999: 
146) describes the Polish system as a combination of  “national tripartite arrangements at one extreme and 
decentralized workplace relations at the other […] what is strikingly absent or weakly developed is the 
intermediate level of  industry-level bargaining”.  
 
                                                 
40 Solidarność is not a confederation but a unitary union, meaning that the company-level member unions do not 
have a separate legal status (cf. Gardawski et al. 2012: 34). Throughout the thesis however, all national unions are 
referred to as confederations due to simplicity and because most reports do so too. 
41 See footnote 37 for representativeness. 
42 There is also a regional and sectoral dimension of tripartite social dialogue. For further information, see Czarzasty 
and Mrozowicki (2013: 10). 
43 For a summary of  attempts to negotiate social pacts and reasons for collapse, see Gardawski et al. (2012: 22) and 
Guardiancich and Pliszkiewicz (2012: 74ff.).  
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6.2 Erosion of Industrial Relations? – Comparing Recent Developments 
The outlined institutional frameworks represent a fixed image, which is no longer entirely applicable. As a 
consequence of  the previously outlined structural changes to the labour market, the industrial relations of  
all three countries have been transformed through many small changes in the operation of  the underlying 
institutional framework.  
Amongst the three cases, the forerunner of  these developments is Germany. Streeck (2009) argues that 
the German model is no longer the highly coordinated social market economy that figures so prominently 
in VoC theory. Similarly, Haipeter and Lehndorff  (2014: 45) find that “from the 1990s [onwards], 
decentralization has become an important element of  German industrial relations”. Exposed to 
globalization pressures as well as more competitive and decentralized industrial relations in Eastern 
Germany promoted through outsourced subsidiaries and newly privatized firms, the export-oriented 
manufacturing industry experienced an “inward-turn” (Palier/ Thelen 2010: 123). Trade unions and the 
state confronted a strengthened capital-side, which increasingly left or refrained from joining employers´ 
associations. These shifted power relations according to Urban (2014: 309f.) explain the shift of  trade 
unions´ role from representing the interests of  all employees and in particular the role of  manufacturing 
unions to set the standards for the whole economy (“social corporatism“) towards becoming 
managements´ partners in securing competitiveness and only focusing on the interests of  a core of  
workers (“competitive corporatism”). Competitive corporatism not only promoted labour market 
dualization by protecting insiders and using outsiders as flexible buffer. It also undercut industry-wide 
collective agreements and promoted a decentralization of  collective bargaining (cf. Lehndorff  2011: 345). 
These decentralization trends in the coordinated industrial relations institutions in connection with the 
growth of  a more liberal private service sector have resulted in a steady but significant decline of  trade 
union density from circa 30 to 19 percent and a decline of  coverage by collective agreements from circa 
70 to 61 percent between the early 1990s until 2010 (cf. Bernaciak et al 2014: 1, appendix 5).  
This decentralization was at first characterized by the informal defection from industry-wide arrangements 
through companies´ opting out of  employers´ associations and pushing for company-level pacts for 
competition negotiated by managements and works councils (cf. Lehndorff  2011: 357; Haipeter/ 
Lehndorff  2014: 55f.).44/45 However, Lehndorff  (interview) finds that since IGM´s “Pforzheim 
Agreement” in 2004, coordinated decentralization prevailed again in the metalworking sector. This implies 
that the negotiating partners agree on opening and hardship clauses and thereby control them (cf. 
Lehndorff  2011: 357ff.; Haipeter/ Lehndorff  2014: 56f.). In fact, Lehndorff  (interview) finds that this 
even had the positive side-effect of  attributing greater responsibility and thereby activating local unionists 
and works councils. Ver.di tried to introduce similar standards in the aftermath. Moreover, the economic 
crisis sparked a reactivation of  corporatism, so-called “crisis corporatism”, between equally weakened 
                                                 
44 This was enabled on the basis of  the revised Works Constitution Act of  1972, which empowered works councils 
in their negotiations with management and their autonomy vis-à-vis the trade unions (cf. Palier/ Thelen 2010: 24). 
45 In correspondence with this, the coding for opening clauses in the ICTWSS database (2013: n.p.) changes from 
“limited use” until 1999 to “widespread, including pay” onwards. 
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social partners to address the emergency situation (Urban 2014: 311). Although this largely applied to the 
manufacturing unions, coordination ranged from bipartite emergency coalitions at company level to 
tripartite consultation on economic policy during a number of  “Konjunkturgipfel” (Zagelmeyer 2010: 5).  
Although more recently than in Germany, similar trends of  erosion and decentralization can be observed 
in Slovenia since the mid-2000s. Krašovec and Lužar (2013: n.p.) find that although the main framework 
of  bipartite and tripartite negotiations has remained in place, there have been many breaches of  
procedures. With respect to bipartite bargaining, negotiations on new collective agreements have slowed 
down and over five times more instances of  collective agreement breaches were recorded than in the pre-
crisis period (cf. Bernaciak et al. 2014: 16). Once employers were no longer compelled to organize 
themselves in the Chamber of  Commerce, they began to push for the end of  sector-wide collective 
bargaining (cf. Crowley/ Stanojević 2011: 286). This is highlighted by the decline of  membership in 
employers´ associations to 40 percent (in 2011) and increase of  opening clauses in collective agreements 
(cf. Crowley/ Stanojević 2011: 273; ICTWSS 2013: n.p.).46 Lukič (interview) adds that in 2013, two 
powerful employers in the construction and chemical sector left the respective collective agreements, 
which he assesses as a powerful signal to trade unions and other employers. Although the bargaining 
coverage is still extremely high (92 percent in 2009), the parallel trend of  declining union density (26 
percent in 2010) constitutes an alarming trend with major implications for the bargaining power of  unions 
(cf. interview Lukič; Bernaciak et al 2014: 1, appendix 5).  
Things do not look much better with respect to social dialogue, the second important source of  organized 
labour´s institutional power in Slovenia. Governments seem to have used the pretext of  the crisis to 
terminate the tradition of  national social pacts and the established coordinated procedures that prevailed 
since 1993 (cf. Glassner et al. 2011: 310). This is highlighted by unilateral government attempts in 2006, 
2011 and 2012 to push through reforms. Moreover, since 2007 no new encompassing social pact has been 
negotiated (cf. Krašovec/ Lužar 2013: n.p.). Stanojević (2010: 11ff.) suggests that the power relations 
underlying tripartite dialogue have become more asymmetrical: social pacts are negotiated by trade unions 
with decimated membership, by less disciplined employers and by embattled governments. Lukič 
(interview) adds that priority has shifted towards reporting to the EU and if  there is time, governments 
talk to the social partners.  
Unlike in Slovenia, economic slowdown has not left as deep of  a mark in Poland as far as industrial 
relations and the overall shape of  collective bargaining are concerned (Czarzasty 2013). The long-term 
trends of  the pre-crisis period have continued: single-employer bargaining still dominates and multi-
employer bargaining stagnates (no new agreements have been concluded), collective bargaining continues 
to play a marginal role and no single case of  extending a collective agreement has ever occurred (ibid.). 
Social dialogue on the national level entered a deadlock phase. While in 2008 the social partners negotiated 
the anti-crisis package in the TC at the outset of  the economic crisis (expired 2011), the climate changed 
                                                 
46 Opening clauses increased from “exceptional use” until 2007 to a sudden “widespread use, including pay” since 
2008 (ICTWSS 2013). 
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again once it became obvious that the crisis would have less severe effects than expected. Since 2010, the 
Tusk government increasingly disregarded social dialogue and unilaterally turned towards austerity 
measures, legislated budget cuts and obstructed discussion in the TC (e.g. unilateral rise of  the national 
minimum wage and pension reform) (cf. Czarzasty/ Mrozowicki 2013: 3f., 11; Curtarelli et al. 2013: 18). 
Social dialogue reached a critical junction in June 2013 when the three confederations suspended 
participation in the TC in protest of  the government´s unilateral labour code changes. The confederations 
prepared a joint proposal on a reform of  social dialogue, which demands obligatory tripartite consultation 
on changes in labour and social policies (Gardawski 2014). 
This overview of  the recent developments underlying the formally intact institutional frameworks 
complements the previous comparison in important respects. It shows that unions´ institutional power 
through coordinated institutions is not only weak in Poland, but increasingly fragmented and undermined 
in Germany and Slovenia too. However, there is much diversity and ambiguity within this common trend. 
In Germany for instance, the recent crisis corporatism has ambivalent effects. On the negative side, it was 
short-lived and lost ground with the stabilization of  profits and economic conditions (cf. Lehndorff  2013: 
192). While social corporatism implied welfare distribution and concessions towards employees’ demands, 
Urban (2014: 311) finds that crisis corporatism reduced unions´ role to moderating the crisis costs. Even 
the interests of  core workers remained largely subaltern as displayed in the concessions on remuneration, 
working time and working conditions; not to mention the massive lay-off  of  outsiders. On the positive 
side, Lehndorff  (2013) reminds that after two decades of  decline, the “renaissance of  social partnership” 
implied a comeback of  trade unions in terms of  attention by employer federations and the government 
(ibid.: 191f.). Moreover, their public reputation has risen, as manifest in the increased sympathy of  the 
public during the long Kindergarten strike in 2009, a sector not associated with the crisis (ibid.).  
In Poland and Slovenia, the marginalization of  trade unions is much more accompanied by a political 
dispute with the government. This must be attributed to the fact that the undermining of  social dialogue 
takes centre stage rather than collective bargaining. The political escalation of  this situation can be 
observed in Poland. The concerted withdrawal from the TC constitutes a new dimension in many 
respects. On the one hand, it underlines the institutional marginalization of  organized labour by the 
neoliberal political elites. The government has ignored the withdrawal from social dialogue for over one 
year already. This provides for poor prospects regarding changes of  the institutional framework towards 
more labour inclusion. Ultimately, it also provides for poor prospects concerning the improvement of  
outsiders´ working and living conditions, at least in the short-run. On the other hand, the withdrawal 
symbolizes the possibility of  empowerment through institutional disempowerment and underlines the 
unifying effect.  
Evaluating the situation in Slovenia is most difficult, since the crisis set in motion the most recent and 
severe dynamics of  institutional transformation. Krašovec and Lužar (2013: n.p) find that thus far, the 
situation is one of  increasing tension without major formal changes. The direction of  developments 
depends on the contents and form of  implementation of  future policies. But despite being weaker today 
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than in the 1990s, unions in Slovenia still possess a high level of  institutional power and sanctioning 
potential, which has to be respected by any future government (cf. Stanojević 2010: 17). 
 
6.3 Summary of Observations: Locating the Varieties of Industrial   
      Relations  
On the basis of  the previous discussion, table 1 summarizes some of  the central features of  the three 
countries´ industrial relations. 

















Union landscape Dominance of  few 
powerful industrial 
unions; representative 





Myriad of  fragmented 
company unions; three 
important confederations 
with institutional power 
Collective 
bargaining 




Not institutionalized Formally institutionalized; 
until recently very effective 
Formally institutionalized 
but structurally weak 
Major channel of  
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Collective bargaining Social dialogue Social dialogue 
Trends and crisis 
impact 
Two decades of  
decentralization; crisis 
corporatism 
Severe crisis impact: 




illusory corporatism; social 
dialogue deadlock since 
crisis 
Table 1: Industrial Relations in Germany, Slovenia and Poland 
Closer inspection of  the three countries´ industrial relations revealed that Slovenia and Germany depict 
relatively strong institutions of  neo-corporatism, while Poland was reconfirmed as mixed case. Slovenia´s 
sector-level collective bargaining and national social dialogue represent one extreme end in terms of  
institutionalization of  organized labour. The other end is represented by Poland, which is characterized by 
decentralized company-level bargaining, competitive pluralism and illusory corporatism on the national 
level. The German system must be located somewhere in the middle. Unlike in Slovenia, where 
encompassing union confederations hold a lot of  institutional power too, in Germany institutional power 
is concentrated in a small number of  large, single trade unions. There is no institutionalized tripartite 
social dialogue as in Slovenia or Poland, which formally attributes institutional power to the few 
confederations. This renders collective bargaining all the more important.  
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As a result of  these country-specific institutional configurations, the focus of  organized labour´s strategies 
against precarious work in Slovenia and Poland lies more strongly on the disputes in the tripartite councils, 
on government reforms and on social dialogue. Here, strategies have a more political character. Vice versa, 
in Germany the focus on collective bargaining shifts the focus of  organized labour´s strategies against 
precarious work to the conflict with employers and exposes more clearly the tension between the 
industrial and the private service sector. The different institutional realities come to be more strongly 
reflected in the respective unions´ strategies. These institutional variations even between the more likely 
cases of  Germany and Slovenia reveal that simply distinguishing between the absence and presence of  
coordinated industrial relations more generally is insufficient.  
The crisis impacted the institutional regimes to various degrees. Slovenia´s strong neo-corporatism has 
significantly been weakened since the crisis although formal mechanisms are still intact. In Germany and 
Poland, organized labour was already weakened before the crisis. In Germany, crisis corporatism 
reinforced long-term trends of  decentralization and dualization between the manufacturing core and the 
private services. However, it also increased unions´ public reputation. Similarly, in Poland the crisis itself  
had no severe impact as such. Yet, the withdrawal of  the confederations from the TC constitutes a new 
quality of  the previous developments. Overall, an undermining, decentralization and fragmentation of  
formally intact institutional powers can be observed, despite varying in degree and stage of  development. 
To put it pointedly, it may be argued that the prospects for trade unions to effectively counteract the 
massive expansion of  precarious work through their formal institutional power and the established 
coordinated strategies seems to be low. How trade unions have adapted to these developments in the 
national industrial relations institutions is discussed in the subsequent chapter. The goal is to assess the 
impact of  the country-specific institutional frameworks on union strategies and to draw conclusions for 
the VoC debate. 
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7. Shaping Trade Union Strategies: Institutions and Beyond 
7.1 The Impact of National Industrial Relations on Union Strategies 
The previous chapter discussed the variation between the institutional frameworks and the recent 
processes of  erosion taking place within these national variations. This has far-reaching consequences for 
trade unions and implies that they must address the problem of  precarious work from a position of  
weakness rather than a position of  strength. Instead of  remaining passive however, it was shown that all 
trade unions have during the last decade started to adopt the issue on their agendas and to address it. In 
order to understand, how their strategies reflect the country-specific institutional constraints and 
opportunities as well as the recent developments within them, the analysis builds on insights provided by 
Glassner et al. (2011) and Mrozowicki et al. (2013). They argue that negotiated responses in form of  
collective bargaining are frequently pursued by trade unions in multi-employer bargaining systems, 
whereas in single-employer systems, they pursue unilateral strategies. As revealed in the previous chapter, 
the multi-versus-single employer dichotomy is too simplified. Both the variety within and the effectiveness of  
coordinated industrial relations institutions must be considered. However, their insights and distinction 
between negotiation-based and unilateral strategies (as defined in chapter 3) forms the basis for the subsequent 
analysis. 
 
7.1.1 Negotiated Strategies: Dancing within the Institutional Framework  
Elements of  negotiation are present in all three countries under investigation. However, the form, 
frequency and intensity vary greatly. Poland is certainly the weakest case as regards negotiated responses. 
At the same time, it is probably the most-straight forward case as regards the impact of  the institutional 
framework on union strategies. Decentralized collective bargaining, competitive pluralism and high-inter-
union competition, strong fragmentation, difficult access to companies, low bargaining coverage and 
union density and the fact that outsiders (often in non-dependent or civil law employment relations) are 
mostly excluded from the institutional mechanisms of  interest representation provide little scope to 
effectively address precarious workers on the company level (cf. Krzywdzinski 2010: 290; interview 
Mrozowicki). On the national level, coordinated channels of  negotiation are mostly absent too as social 
dialogue is only illusory. It might be available in times of  crisis (e.g. 2009 negotiation of  anti-crisis 
package), but not with regards to limiting and re-regulating precarious work. In the face of  these country-
specific institutional constraints, which render institutional power ineffective, and increasing 
marginalization, Solidarność, OPZZ and FZZ have resorted almost exclusively to unilateral strategies. 
In Slovenia, seemingly the other end of  the extreme, strong bipartite and tripartite bargaining and 
extensive collective bargaining coverage seem to provide unions with remarkable institutional leverage and 
opportunities. Especially the institutionalization of  social dialogue through social pacts opens the 
confederations efficient and coordinated channels on the national level, which are not even present in 
Germany. This institutional and also political power proved itself  very successful at several points. For 
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instance, in 2012 the government gave in to higher minimum wages as the confederations´ threatened to 
interrupt all social dialogue. Similarly, they managed to separate the negotiation on the ´flexicurity´ 
package in 2012, whereby they could avert some flexibility elements and safeguard security elements. 
Moreover, since averting the Pahor government´s attack on social dialogue in 2011/12, the confederations 
have largely returned to the negotiation table. Showing that they would not give up social dialogue easily, 
the institutional power proves to be working again (at least temporarily). This is highlighted by the 
negotiation of  (at least) a number of  concessions favourable for outsiders in the 2013 labour market 
reform. 
In Germany, the conflict lines run differently than in Slovenia and Poland. In the latter two, the 
confederations´ strategies are greatly shaped by the question whether social dialogue is available and 
efficient or not. In Germany, the institutional power of  organized labour centres on collective bargaining 
through single industrial unions. Since the effectiveness of  institutional power therefore depends on the 
position within the production regime, the approaches of  ver.di and IGM differ and reflect the dualized 
labour market. Even if  more decentralized than a few decades ago, IGM still operates in a “coordinated 
world” (Haipeter 2011: 2). The traditional insider-union usually focuses on what can be implemented 
institutionally. Although becoming less and less during the last decades, IGM has nevertheless continued 
to pursue its established strategies. This explains why IGM for a long time (competitive corporatism) and 
even recently (crisis corporatism) concentrated on the established business in the core. Issues and 
demands that exceeded the scope of  what was possible within the coordinated institutional framework 
were of  no interest (cf. interview Lehndorff). IGM frequently opposed the campaigns of  outsider-unions 
like ver.di or NGG, not to speak of  even addressing outsiders themselves (cf. Hassel 2014: 73).47 
Lehndorff  (interview) states that the strong institutionalization of  rights and effectiveness of  traditional 
channels of  influence have a retarding effect on organisations like IGM. It has taken years to realize that 
the expansion of  agency work undermines the effectiveness of  its formal institutional power if  left 
unaddressed. Moreover, mobilizing support of  members and union officials has also delayed adaptation 
strategies. However, once institutionally strong organisations such as IGM learn that they must address a 
problem, they have far greater possibilities at their disposal. The conclusion of  equal wages for agency 
workers through an industry-wide collective agreement probably constitutes the most intriguing example 
of  embracing precarious workers through established coordinated mechanisms. Institutional strength is 
increasingly used politically to pick up new issues such as agency work and make them part of  collective 
bargaining (cf. interview Lehndorff). Thus, in a still “coordinated world”, IGM´s strategy makes use of  
the country-specific institutional opportunities and aims at revitalizing and developing them (Haipeter 
2011: 2).  
Comparing Germany and Slovenia, it becomes obvious that the resource of  institutional power to address 
precarious work is located on different levels. This attracts attention to the absence of  outsider-oriented 
strategies on the sectoral level in Slovenia. Unlike IGM in Germany, collective bargaining in Slovenia has 
                                                 
47 For instance, its leadership opposed to join protests with ver.di against the Hartz reforms and initially opposed the 
national minimum wage. 
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remained focused on insider protection (Bernaciak et al. 2014; interview Lukič). This is even more 
surprising considering the extremely high bargaining coverage, which suggests high institutional power. 
Time-lag is an insufficient explanation to explain this defensive strategy. The far-reaching cancelation of  
compulsory association of  private employers dates almost ten years back and although the more 
systematic expansion of  non-standard employment is a rather recent phenomenon, it is not entirely new. 
The quiescence of  Slovenia´s trade unions on the sectoral level can better be explained institutionally by 
looking at the underlying power relations. Institutional power (extremely high bargaining coverage) is 
rendered ineffective by low organisational power (rapidly falling union density) substantiating it. 
Lehndorff  (2014: 328) describes this as “Münchhausen effect”. In the face of  such shifted power balances 
underlying formally intact collective bargaining, trade unions have refrained from introducing new 
demands and practices that include outsiders (cf. interview Lukič). The fact that only the metalworking 
union has managed to secure improvements for outsiders by credibly threatening with strike provides a 
reverse example to highlight the importance of  substantiating institutional power with organisational and 
structural power (ibid.). 
 
7.1.2 Unilateral Strategies: Boxing outside the Institutional Framework 
The Slovenian example powerfully demonstrates the impact of  the presence or absence of  effective 
coordinated channels on union strategies. The confederations addressed precarious work through social 
dialogue when this channel was effective. After all, as pointed out, it provides them with tremendous 
institutional power. When the government attempted to dismantle this coordinated institution, the 
confederations switched to unilateral channels. The wave of  campaign- and mobilization-based initiatives 
against mini-jobs in 2011/12 highlights the importance of  looking beyond formally intact institutions and 
at the underlying power relations. The confederations chose to not accept the undermining of  their 
formally intact institutional power and resorted to unilateral mobilization. Thereby, they benefited from 
the presence of  a larger anti-government and anti-austerity movement. Similarly, the introduction of  mini-
jobs in Germany ten years earlier provided a template of  what could be expected. By joining a broader 
protest movement to prevent the government´s deregulation attempts, the union confederations 
demonstrated their “sanctioning potential” (Stanojevič 2010: 17). So far, social dialogue has been restored 
and the confederations returned to the negotiation table. However, its quality has deteriorated. It remains 
to be seen how the confederations will react to this incremental transformation. The move towards 
unilateral strategies in 2011/12 signalized that they will not give up the coordinated institutions easily. 
The Polish confederations´ unilateral strategies at first seem to resemble the events in Slovenia. However, 
the development and position out of  which they pursue them greatly differ to the brief  activism of  
Slovenia´s confederations. This comes as no surprise, since unions in Poland are in a weaker institutional 
position than in Slovenia and Germany. Yet, they possess more power resources than in the Baltic and 
South-Eastern European states. According to Bernaciak et al. (2014: 5), “this both requires and enables 
them to adopt a more proactive approach, with […] openness to a broader set of  societal interests”. 
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Therefore, Solidarność, OPZZ and FZZ must “[retain and expand] their capacity to collectively mobilise 
workers, [to overcome] the historical legacy of  fragmentation and [to reinvent] themselves as political, civil 
society and economic actors all at the same time” (Gardawski et al. 2012: 59). This is reflected in the 
confederations´ agendas; most notably in the nationwide campaign against junk contracts and the attempts 
to alter the legal framework to guarantee full workers´ rights to self-employed and civil law workers. 
Mrozowicki and Czarzasty (interviews) stress that the confederations´ political activism through which 
they managed to initiate a discussion on the quality of  jobs in a society, which suffered high 
unemployment, must be greatly appreciated. Furthermore, while it might be too early to speak of  a 
systematic turn to organizing, the confederations seem increasingly aware of  the need to rebalance low 
institutional power by actively attracting new members and building up organisational power and 
mobilization capacity (cf. Bernaciak et al. 2014: 6). According to Gardawski et al. (2012: 20), successful 
organizing campaigns by especially Solidarność contributed to building up a surprisingly strong wave of  
labour mobilization with respect to the recent protests.48 The adaptation strategies of  the Polish 
confederations thus reflect quite well the country-specific institutional constraints. Yet, in the absence of  
effective institutional leverage, their activism has not yet provided any quick and concrete successes, such 
as the negotiated achievements by IGM (equal wages for agency workers) or by Slovenia´s confederations 
(safeguarding security and preventing flexibility elements in social pacts).  
Germany provides a different picture to Slovenia and Poland as it displays more internal diversity with 
respect to union strategies. Unilateral elements were present in the outlined responses to precarious work 
by both IGM and ver.di. However, their application differed and reflected the different institutional 
position, from which they were pursued. As mentioned in the previous section, the still largely 
coordinated environment within which IGM navigates channelled the focus onto re-activating and 
widening these coordinated channels to include new outsider-related demands. Therefore, IGM learned to 
use unilateral tactics in addition to and in the context of traditional bargaining. These include the raising 
of  public attention through mass media and campaign-elements. Organizing also entered IGM´s agenda, 
but displays a stronger degree of  modification and localization of  the concept towards the coordinated 
context (cf. Wetzel et al. 2011: 13-21).  
Conversely, the outlined strategies by ver.di reflected considerations for the institutional constraints in 
Germany´s private service sector, which provides a more liberal and union-hostile environment. Its 
unilateral campaigns were to build or consolidate coordinated institutions like works councils and 
collective bargaining (cf. Haipeter 2011: 2). IGM was hailed by employers and the government for its 
“sensitive approach” during the crisis, whereas ver.di “was blamed periodically for its partly more conflict-
prone approach” (Lehndorff  2011: 342). Unlike IGM, ver.di had to learn early on how to complement 
weak institutional power through unilateral, conflict-prone strategies both within and outside the context 
                                                 
48 Mrozowicki (interview) stresses however that even though unions began the debate, it does not necessarily imply 
that people, who are affected or oppose precarious work, care for unions. As mentioned earlier, the emerging 
opposition movement within the Polish society against austerity and deregulation is politically undefined. There is a 




of  collective bargaining. To this end, it was the first union to proactively engage in revitalization strategies. 
Ver.di developed some memorable political and public campaigns and advanced comprehensive organizing 
strategies, which established coalitions with civil society and social movements. But despite these 
continuous and innovative efforts of  ver.di, concrete results have been meagre (cf. interview Lehndorff). 
This reconfirms the detrimental impact of  altered power relations in the private service sector on the 
formally intact coordinated bargaining mechanisms and provides for poor prospects that ver.di can tackle 
the problem of  precarious work by itself.  
 
7.1.3 Summary of Results: Union Strategies Reflect the Effectiveness of  
        National Industrial Relations 
 
From the analysis of  observations it can be inferred that if  they were available and effective, unions favoured the 
coordinated channels provided by the institutional framework to negotiate bilaterally or trilaterally for better working 
conditions of  precarious workers and a re-regulation of  non-standard employment. This could be 
observed in the cases of  IGM and Slovenia´s confederations. They still navigate in a coordinated 
institutional environment and predominantly use the institutional power at their disposal. However, they 
increasingly mix their strategies and add unilateral to the still largely negotiation-based tactics. Thereby, 
they seek to widen the coordinated channels to include outsider-related demands and ultimately to defend 
their still effective but crumbling institutional power. In contrast, the Polish confederations and ver.di in 
the private service sector navigate in a rather liberal and union-hostile environment despite the formal 
presence of  neo-corporatist institutions. The absence of  effective coordinated channels to tackle 
precarious work explains their focus on unilateral strategies. They aim at building or consolidating 
coordinated institutions like collective bargaining or social dialogue. These conclusions reconfirm a 
number of  initial assumptions.  
First, VoC theory provides a valuable analytical tool insofar as it draws attention to the importance of  
institutional preconfigurations. They constitute actors´ framework for action and determine their opportunity 
structures, whereby they shape their preferences and strategies. Alternative theoretical approaches seem 
less appropriate to explain the particular union strategies. For example, because of  the historical East-West 
divide, it seems plausible to place variation in cultural legacies rather than institutions at the core of  the 
comparison (Hamann 1998; Polletta/ Jasper 2001). Obviously, unionism in the two former ´socialist´ 
states is shaped by a different cultural legacy than in Germany. Without going too much into detail, the 
former two can look back at strong, more assertive and political labour movements. Germany´s unions in 
contrast allegedly display a ´culture of  legalism´ and perceive themselves as ´guarantor of  social peace´ (cf. 
Dribbusch/ Birke 2012: 12). A comparison based on cultural legacy might explain why unilateral tactics in 
Poland and Slovenia more frequently display mass mobilization (e.g. demonstrations, general strikes). 
However, it is less adequate to explain particular union strategies, for instance why the confederations in 
Slovenia largely stick to negotiation-based channels whereas in Poland this is obviously not the case. 
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Neither can it explain the rapid switch of  Slovenia´s confederations between negotiated and unilateral 
mobilization strategies depending on the quality of  social dialogue. 
Second, the findings reconfirm the importance of  taking a closer look at differences in union strategies 
and looking inside similar institutional regimes. As predicted by VoC theory, the presence of  coordinated 
institutions plays a great role. The unions under investigation preferred using negotiation-based 
mechanisms to address precarious employment as they are source for institutional power and provide for 
direct influence on employment conditions. Since Poland has been reconfirmed as mixed case, VoC theory 
could have accommodated the exclusively unilateral strategies of  the Polish confederations due to the 
presence of  liberal features and weak corporatism. However, focusing on inter-regime variety would have 
only seen the presence of  formally intact neo-corporatist institutions in Germany and Slovenia and would 
have predicted similar, mostly negotiated union responses. This institutional determinism would have 
ignored the outlined country-specific patterns and lines of  conflict between and within Germany and 
Slovenia. They only became visible by looking deeper into the country-specific institutional features. 
Third and correspondingly, the analysis of  observations powerfully reconfirmed the importance of  
adopting a modified understanding of  institutions. Union strategies were not only shaped by the logic of  
whether or not coordinated channels existed, but more specifically and maybe more strongly by their 
effectiveness. VoC theory´s focus on the formal presence of  coordinated institutions would have failed to see 
the emergence of  unilateral strategies in Germany and Slovenia. These can only be explained by looking at 
how the introduction of  liberal features in the labour market has affected the effectiveness of  these 
coordinated institutions and thus of  unions´ institutional power. It was shown that the form, frequency 
and intensity of  unilateral strategies differ and very much reflect the different institutional positions and 
motivations (defending or re-establishing coordinated institutions) out of  which they are pursued.  
Returning to the research question, it can be replied that the country-specific varieties of  industrial 
relations have very much shaped trade unions´ adaptation strategies towards the new challenge of  
dualization. Thereby, considerations for the effectiveness of  national industrial relations institutions have 
played a major role. Of  course, the more attention is paid to institutional specificities, the more difficult it 
becomes to draw generalizable conclusions and analytic leverage. Nevertheless, research on intra-regime 
variety should be expanded within VoC debate. This is not only theoretically but also politically important 
since it provides for a better understanding and development of  adequate adaption strategies for trade 
unions to effectively counteract the deregulation of  the labour market, the erosion of  industrial relations 





7.2 Institutional Transformation and Strategic Choice? - Prospects for the 
             Viability of Varieties of Capitalism 
The discussion so far focused on explaining differences in union strategies. However, it would be fatal to 
ignore the obvious common trends. The declining institutional power of  trade unions through changed 
power relations underlying the formally intact industrial relations and the adoption of  unilateral strategies constitute 
recurring themes. This firstly raises the question in how far VoC theory can grasp and include the 
possibility of  institutional transformation. Thereafter and in light of  this, the common trends in union 
strategies shall be discussed.  
 
7.2.1 Varieties of Capitalism and Change: Advancing the Theory 
The rational choice and historical institutionalism, which underlies VoC theory, provides insights on the 
emergence of  coordinated institutions (key word: skill-specific production) and their stickiness. After all, it was 
shown that trade unions preferred negotiation-based channels where possible. Moreover, high-value added 
production continues to attach importance to a core of  stable, skilled employment and of  coordinated 
relations with the social partners. Conversely, employers and governments seeking to remove the 
coordinated institutions faced strong protest when they directly attacked them. Hence, initial choices have 
proven to matter. Institutions cannot easily be removed and external pressures for deregulation and 
liberalization have not led to full convergence.  
However, VoC theory overstates the resilience of  initial choices for coordinated institutions and actor 
preferences. The prediction that employers in general strive to protect institutional arrangements, resulting 
in a “lock-in effect” or “stable equilibrium of  coordinated institutions” has not been confirmed (Crowley/ 
Stanojevič 2011: 286). The preferences of  employers and also governments can and do seemingly alter, as 
displayed by the deliberate defections (of  some) from coordinated institutions. Captured in the notion of  
effectiveness of  institutional power, the analysis illustrated that processes of  institutional transformation 
(see chapter 2.1.) have shaped unions´ strategies in all three countries. For instance, social dialogue in 
Slovenia and Poland has been undermined through informal obstruction and deliberate disregard by the 
governments. This explains the brief  swing of  Slovenia´s confederations to unilateral strategies. In Poland, 
the confederations themselves withdrew from social dialogue to signalize its continuous illusiveness. In 
Germany and Slovenia, industry-wide collective bargaining has been hollowed out through defection by 
employers deliberately opting out of  employers´ associations (cf. Hall/ Thelen 2009: 262). Institutional 
drift can explain the choice by IGM and Slovenia´s confederations to add unilateral elements. Even 
though both are still acting in a largely coordinated environment, their institutional power becomes 
obsolete if  they fail to maintain it. Collective bargaining for instance increasingly erodes as agency 
employment and the private service sector grow and come to proportionally outweigh the shrinking 
coordinated core (cf. Thelen 2012: 147). The widening of  the established coordinated mechanisms to new 
contents such as agency work therefore constitutes an adaptation to the changed circumstances.  
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These transformative developments within coordinated industrial relations institutions have undoubtedly 
shaped unions´ strategies. This shows that opposing the idea of  full convergence to a single type of  
neoliberal capitalism cannot have the opposite effect of  preaching institutional resilience. For VoC theory to 
survive as a viable theory in a complex globalized world, it must overcome the institutional determinism and open up for 
incremental transformative change. This requires two adaptations. First, VoC theory must adopt a modified 
approach towards institutions, which understands them as social and political constructs or structures and 
thereby takes account of  the underlying power relations (see discussion chapter 2 and 3). These power 
relations are not fixed but alter in the face of  economic accumulation and crisis dynamics. The thesis 
adopted such a dynamic approach and thereby showed that accounting for institutional transformation is 
possible and necessary. It thereby built on the many contributions and insights, in particular by Streeck 
and Thelen, which have already greatly enriched this theory. Second, the result of  these transformational 
processes seems to be neither institutional convergence nor divergence as predicted by Hall and Soskice. 
The entrance and expansion of  liberal institutional features from the margins alongside established 
coordinated features through such processes of  drift or displacement suggest a mixed outcome of  hybrid 
institutional systems. “Hybridization” describes the import of  institutions and their transformation via 
their interaction with domestic institutional forms (Boyer 2005b: 368). Thus, accounting for 
transformation within VoC theory breaks with the functionalist idea of  institutional complementarities, 
which reproduce themselves as they provide a source for competitive advantage. Instead, the theory must 
incorporate a certain degree of  freedom within institutional regimes and recognize that the fit among 
institutions is always only partial and transitory (ibid.). 
 
7.2.2 Empowerment through Disempowerment? - Beyond Institutions 
It seems appropriate to end the discussion by returning to the core problem, which this thesis investigated: 
how do trade unions respond to the expansion of  a precarious labour market? It was found that their 
strategies are heavily shaped by the institutional framework and whether or not it provides for effective 
channels to negotiate concrete improvements for precarious workers. However, the analysis also showed 
that unions´ strategies are more than one-to-one reflections of  the institutional framework, which 
endlessly repeat themselves. They neither stick to one practice only, nor do they jump infinitively between 
the same strategies depending on the condition of  the institutional framework.  
Instead, the analysis revealed that trade unions possess a certain scope for action and are able to 
learn and adapt their strategies to processes of  transformation within the institutional framework. Of  
course, the selection of  strategic options and the ability to innovative practices depends on a realistic 
analysis of  the institutional context, which limits and opens up resources for action (Müller-Jentsch 1996; 
Urban 2014). The transformative processes associated with dualization undermine unions´ institutional 
power in all three countries. This has ambivalent political consequences. On the one hand, it marks the 
disempowerment of  trade unions vis-à-vis capital and implies deteriorating prospects to effectively and 
directly counteract the expansion of  precarious work. On the other hand, this situation simultaneously 
  
 47 
provides room for empowerment and innovation, as it motivates trade unions to rethink the established 
strategies and to examine new approaches. It seems that the protection of  coordinated institutions “will 
rest on the mobilization capacity of  labour rather than on a functional equilibrium based on a cross-class 
coalition led by employers in leading firms“(Crowley/ Stanojević 2011: 284). In other words, unions are 
urged to revitalize other power resources, in particular organisational power. As illustrated by sector-level 
bargaining in Slovenia and IGM in Germany, high bargaining coverage and protection emanating from 
formally intact bargaining structures and legal rights have a retarding effect and produce a much weaker 
sense of  organisational crisis among union leaders (cf. Frege/ Kelly 2004: 17). The degree and immediacy 
of  considerations for organisational power are therefore interlinked with the institutional framework. VoC 
theory could explain these considerations for organisational power if  it looks beyond the formally intact 
institutional frameworks.  
However, VoC theory cannot explain the choice by unions in traditionally coordinated institutional 
frameworks to draw on organizing strategies, which were developed by unions in the neoliberal North-
American context. Instead, this is an intriguing example for “strategic choice” and organisational learning 
(Child 1997: 46f.; Brinkmann et al. 2008: 23; Urban 2014: 304).49 The cooperation by ver.di and contacts 
of  Solidarność with the North American SEIU to gain insights on the latter´s organizing practices 
captures that unions are not locked in the national institutional context but that global diffusion and 
learning processes are taking place. Thereby, new hybrid strategies emerge via the interaction with 
domestic institutional forms. ´Translating organizing´ to the German coordinated institutional 
environment has even resulted in different approaches by IGM and ver.di, reflecting the different 
institutional conditions (cf. Wetzel et al. 2011: 14). More generally however, Haipeter and Lehndorff  
(2014: 63f.) regard the mobilization and activation of  members and outsiders in collective bargaining and 
local conflicts over the derogation from industry standards as strategic unionism, which takes advantage 
of  the German institutional feature of  collective bargaining in a situation, when this same architecture has 
been destabilised.  
“Hard times can often result in strategic paralysis, but can also be a stimulus for the framing of  new 
objectives, levels of  intervention and forms of  action” (Hyman/ Gumbrell-McCormick 2010: 327). Despite 
eroding institutions, trade unions are able of  learning processes outside the established paths and of  adapting to a 
transformed capitalism. They are not locked in determined paths or defensive situations but possess some scope for action and 
strategic choices. There is nothing like a fate for unions to only negotiate regulations that employers want to 
have because they solve their coordination problems and to put up with institutional exhaustion once 
employers and governments lose their interest. The analysis of  observation revealed that even unions with 
relatively effective institutional power such as IGM or Slovenia´s confederations are able to realize that the 
widening of  a labour-hostile precarious margin, which ´stabilizes instability´ constitutes a problem for 
them too (cf. Brinkmann et al. 2006: 62). Yet, it was also shown that organisational learning and strategic 
innovation are not a necessity either. The brief  mobilization period of  Slovenia´s confederations was not a 
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 This idea bases on the work of the Jena Working Group on Strategic Unionism.  
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necessity. They chose not to wait or restore the governments´ interest for social dialogue through compliant 
or diplomatic behaviour. Poland´s confederations demonstrated until the mid-2000s that institutional 
marginalization, expansion of  precarious work and declining membership rates do not necessarily need to 
trigger union activism. Similarly, Slovenia´s sector-level unions also illustrate that the ineffectiveness of  
institutional power to address new challenges must not necessarily result in unilateral strategies, but that 
they rather do not address the issue of  precarious work at all.  
It is unions´ own strategic understanding of  their role, which decides whether they recognize and address 
the challenge posed by labour market dualization and institutional transformation or whether they accept 
their defensive situation. In order to play an active role in the national conflict over welfare redistribution 
and for a more social order on the labour market, trade unions are demanded as “autonomous political 
actor” (Lehndorff  2013: 193) and must assume the self-perception of  a “constructive veto-player” (Urban 
2014: 321). This requires strategic innovation and sufficient mobilization of  other power resources to 
rebalance institutional power (cf. interview Lukič). It includes in particular a bottom-up approach, which 
activates and empowers a large and inclusive organisational basis. Ultimately, all this requires trade unions 
to overcome insider-outsider divides within their own logic and to be open to broader sets of  societal 
interests. The comparative analysis traced initial points of  learning and innovation processes in the 
respective trade unions. In the face of  institutional transformation, there seems to be a window of  
opportunity for the reflection on and the re-definition of  trade unions´ role within capitalist society. It 
remains to be seen what the outcome of  the current developments will be. It may well be that for instance 
the adoption of  organizing elements is only a brief  trend, which will be abandoned again once high 
membership rates or institutional power are re-established. For trade unions to remain a powerful actor in 
these transformational processes and to tackle the increasing labour market dualization, they should 




The study at hand aimed at contributing to the complex and controversial discussion surrounding the 
impact of  external pressures for liberalization and deregulation on national institutions. VoC theory has so 
far largely focused on differences between types of  institutional regimes and similarities within them. The 
main objectives of  the thesis were to overcome the invisibility of  variance within similar institutional 
regimes and to highlight its importance for trade unions´ adaption strategies towards the challenge posed 
by labour market dualization and precarization of  work. Moreover, the country comparison aimed at 
connecting the still much separated debates on Western and Eastern European regional institutional 
regimes. The following summarises the most important findings and conclusions. 
Trade union strategies to address labour market dualization are greatly shaped by the institutional framework for action. 
More precisely, their strategies reflect both the country-specific variations in the formal industrial relations institutions as well 
as their effectiveness.  
A shift of  trade unions´ agendas towards addressing outsiders and tackling the expansion of  precarious 
work can be observed in the three countries under investigation. The comparative study showed that their 
strategies towards this new challenge greatly reflect country-specific variation within the industrial 
relations. Thus, rather than distinguishing exclusively between the presence or absence of  coordinated 
institutions as postulated by VoC theory, the comparison revealed the importance of  looking at variance 
within coordinated institutional systems. This counts in particular for the two more similar cases of  
Germany and Slovenia, while different union strategies in the Polish mixed case could have probably been 
accounted for by a focus on inter-regime variety. Moreover, it was also reconfirmed that this must imply 
considerations for the effectiveness of  these national institutions. The work included important 
contributions to the original theory by scholars, who sought to overcome its initial determinism. This 
implied a dynamic and political understanding of  institutions as social regimes, which are substantiated by 
power relations. Despite country-specific variation in form, duration and intensity, it became obvious that 
the emergence of  a flexible and competitive secondary labour market has severely undermined the 
effectiveness of  established and formally intact institutional mechanisms for union influence in the three 
countries under investigation. This provides for poor prospects that trade unions can counteract the 
precarious working conditions of  outsiders through the established strategies.  
In sum, on the example of  trade union strategies against precarious work this work confirmed that 
institutions still matter. More precisely, before anything else unions tried to use the institutionally provided 
channels of  negotiation with employers and governments. If  these were ineffective, they mostly resorted 
to unilateral strategies, in particular campaign-and mobilization-based tactics. The increasing undermining 
of  institutional power also explains the growing considerations for organisational power. Again, only a 
closer inspection of  the national institutional context revealed the different positions out of  which unions 
and confederations pursued particular strategies. IGM in Germany and the Slovenian confederations still 
dispose over a lot of  institutional power and try to defend the effectiveness of  coordinated mechanisms. 
IGM successfully managed to open collective bargaining to the outsider topic of  agency work. Slovenia´s 
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confederations addressed precarious work when possible through tripartite bargaining and tried to defend 
the quality of  social dialogue. Conversely, ver.di and the Polish confederations have been confronted with 
ineffective channels for negotiation for a long time and have learned to adapt to the more liberal and 
competitive environment. The Polish confederations tackled the expansion of  junk contracts almost 
exclusively through political activism and public campaigns. Ver.di addressed the several facets and 
political implications of  precarious working conditions in a similar way either independent of  or in the 
context of  bargaining rounds, hoping to make the latter more effective. 
The Theory of  Varieties of  Capitalism must overcome institutional determinism and account for incremental institutional 
transformation as a result of  dynamics in the underlying power relations.  
VoC theory has greatly contributed to the academic debate by offering an alternative to simple 
globalization claims associated with neoliberal convergence. However, the demarcation from convergence 
to a single, neoliberal type of  capitalism cannot have the opposite effect of  preaching institutional 
resilience and determinism and ignoring transformative dynamics. By adopting a modified approach 
towards institutions, which took account of  their effectiveness, the study shed light on the dynamic 
transformation processes and power struggles underlying the formal institutional arrangements. 
Institutions must be historically embedded as they only stabilize a certain power balance for a certain 
period of  time. The re-organisation of  global production, the shift of  power towards mobile capital and 
the rise of  neoliberal ideology amongst political elites has set in motion processes, which challenge the 
established balances and social contracts as well as institutional foundations in the three countries.  
The result might neither be institutional convergence nor institutional divergence, as predicted by VoC 
theory. Instead, the idea was raised that this might lead to hybridization of  institutional regimes. VoC 
theory has many weaknesses but nevertheless, the theory should not be abandoned too easily. A widened 
approach, which loosens the institutional determinism and idea of  institutional complementarities, can 
take account of  institutional change transpiring along the periphery without a direct attack on core 
institutions. What this does to these core institutions in the long-run represents an important area for 
future research, which could greatly advance the viability of  VoC theory. 
Union strategies are shaped but not determined by the national institutional frameworks. Defensive situations can also 
promote organisational learning and strategic innovation.  
It was found that national institutional frameworks cannot easily be removed and greatly shape local 
actors´ preferences and strategies. As discussed, there is important national variance, which shapes trade 
unions´ particular adaptation strategies and should therefore not be ignored. Simultaneously, there are also 
some obvious common trends in union strategies, which should not be ignored either. Seemingly, in times 
of  crises - and the eroding institutional power constitutes such an instance for trade unions - the 
established habits of  actors open up for new considerations. While it is far from prescribed whether and 
how trade unions adapt to their increasingly defensive situations, it was shown that they are capable of  
organisational learning and strategic innovation. Most of  the studied unions have come to try new things, 
to mix new elements with old ones, to learn from others and translate their practices into the national 
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institutional context. The precise form, intensity and timing are again linked to the institutional context 
and depend on the institutional position out which particular strategies are pursued.  
Exciting but also ambivalent times seem to be ahead. On the one hand, business seems to be running as 
usual in coordinated market economies. In comparison to liberal regimes, employment is still mostly 
regulated and its conditions are repeatedly negotiated by established trade unions, employers and the state. 
In the context of  the crisis, coordination between the social partners took place in all three country cases 
and they jointly negotiated anti-crisis packages. At the same time, these established procedures seem to be 
in turmoil. Slow but steady, the core of  established standards and institutions is becoming marginalized, 
while the margins are increasingly gaining centrality. The “return of  the proletariat” seems to challenge the 
pacification of  class conflict through neo-corporatist labour inclusion (Birke 2011: 148). Trade unions 
assume an ambivalent position in this. Through institutionalization, they have come to be part of  the 
national status quo. They unlearned to pose far-reaching demands, which exceed the frame of  the legally 
and institutionally provided bargaining; they unlearned to be social and political opposition rather than 
´social partners´. Yet, this work attempted to revive interest in trade unions and raise attention for the 
strategic position and active role, which they can assume in the intensifying conflicts over working and 
welfare conditions. In a situation, where trade unions must defend their own position within the 
institutional system and are open to adopt a more proactive approach, there seems to be an opportunity 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 
Czarzasty, Jan, PhD (Warsaw School of  Economics) is Associate Professor at the Department of  
Economic Sociology at the Warsaw School of  Economics. He has been active in industrial relations and 
social dialogue research since the early 2000s. He has been a national correspondent of  the European 
Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) for the past nine years. Further information available under 
http://www.celsi.sk/en/ 
people/person/76/jan-czarzasty/ (last accessed 15/06/2014). 
 
Lehndorff, Steffen, economist, Dr. rer.pol. (University of  Duisburg-Essen) is Director of  the Working-
Time and Work Organisation Department at IAQ. His major areas of  interest are: international 
comparative studies on employment and working-time structures (working-time, work organisation and 
industrial relations in services and manufacturing), impact of  the employment – welfare state nexus on 
employment structures and job quality. Further information available under http://www.iaq.uni-
due.de/personal/ 
maseite.php?mid=005 (last accessed 15/06/2014). 
 
Lukič , Goran is advisor of  ZSSS and deals with labour markets, social aspects and migration. Further 
information available under http://www.sindikat-zsss.si/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=article&id=8&Itemid=5 (only in Slovenian) (last accessed 15/06/2014). 
 
Mrozowicki, Adam, PhD (University of  Wrocław) is a lecturer at the Institute of  Sociology. Since 2010 
he has been a national correspondent of  the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO). His 
current research interests include trade union revitalisation in Central and Eastern Europe. He has 
published in the European Journal of  Industrial Relations and in Work, Employment and Society, 
EMECON, Economic and Industrial Democracy. Further information available under 
http://www.celsi.sk/en/people/ 




Appendix 2: Interview Material – Abstract and Guidelines 
All Interviewees received the following abstract and interview guidelines. Each interviewee received 
guidelines, which were adapted to the country-specific context and to the state of  research.  
 
Abstract: Trade Unionism in the Face of Labour Market Dualization in Germany, 
Slovenia and Poland 
The conceptual background of  the thesis is informed by the debate on Varieties of  Capitalism (VoC). 
Against the widespread assumption that advanced capitalist economies would converge starting in the 
1980s on a single neo-liberal type, the thesis builds upon dualization theory. This theory argues that in 
Europe´s coordinated market economies (CMEs), labour relations are not entirely deregulated but 
segmented into relatively well protected ‘insider’ markets on the one hand and deregulated and 
increasingly precarized ‘outsider’ labour markets on the other hand. This has been a political choice and 
segmentation has been translated into social policy and political representation dualisms. While dualization 
theory has been mainly developed on the cases of  Western capitalist economies, the thesis argues that 
dualization can (in different variations and degrees) be observed in some Eastern European political 
economies too. Thus, the thesis seeks to expand the debate by comparing dualization in Germany, Poland 
and Slovenia. The choice of  country selection, the similarities and differences, will be extensively 
discussed. But to mention shortly, it is based on the work of  Bohle and Greskovits (2012), who identify a 
welfarist social contract in Poland despite embedded neoliberalism and characterize Slovenia´s 
transformational capitalism as neo-corporatist type. In all three countries, the expansion of  atypical and in 
particular precarious work alongside the still dominant standard employment during the last decade will be 
examined. 
The above mentioned forms the conceptual background on the basis of  which the research question is 
posed. It asks how trade unions respond to dualization (dependent variable) and how the country-specific 
industrial relations systems (independent variable) shape their reaction. As I am still in the process of  
researching and since the expert interviews will constitute a crucial element to gain information and 
assessments, it is difficult to name tentative findings at this point. Regarding the dependent variable, the 
preliminary research hypothesis reads that trade union policies in Germany, Poland and Slovenia have 
since the mid-2000s increasingly addressed the issue of  precarization (for instance in Poland the campaign 
against junk contracts, in Slovenia the campaign against mini-jobs). However, union strategies in coping 
with the issue show some variation. I attribute this variation to the differences in the industrial relations 
systems within these coordinated market economies. Thus, I argue that the strong or weak 
institutionalization of  organized labour, the degree of  (de)centralization and fragmentation, level and 
strength of  collective bargaining and existence of  institutions of  corporatism have shaped the paths 
through which trade unions can address outsider issues.  
Reviewing the relevant literature and data to receive an idea of  the ´local picture´ is one thing. However, I 
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find it extremely difficult to assess and evaluate the situation. Therefore, I hope to gain valuable insights, 
opinions and assessments from you, an expert on the issue and in the national context. The goal of  the 
thesis is to contribute to the debate on precarization by understanding how trade unions´ policies are 
formed and how much potential can be attributed to them to address the needs of  labour market 
outsiders. In addition, I believe that it is important to move beyond the convergence or divergence 
dichotomy and discuss how the process of  dualization incrementally transforms institutions in the long-
run without a direct assault on established institutions, thereby evading protest.  
 
Interview Guidelines 
At the beginning of  the interview, the interviewees were asked whether the conversation could be recorded and whether I could 
refer to them by name in the work. 
I base my questions on the assumption that in the German/ Polish/ Slovenian labour market, one can 
observe an increasing dualization between core workers in standard employment (´insiders´) and 
precarious workers in deregulated employment (´outsiders´). I am mainly interested in two aspects: firstly, 
your assessment of  how the major unions in your country have responded to this increasing dualization; 
and secondly, how the institutional features of  the national industrial relations system has shaped unions´ 
responses.  
In Germany, the focus lies on the sectoral but highly autonomous unions (ver.di and IGM), in Poland and 
Slovenia the focus is on the national-level confederations (in Poland: Solidarność, OPZZ and FZZ; in 
Slovenia: ZSSS). 
 
1. Unions and labour market dualization 
Question: How have unions responded to the increasing spread of  atypical (in particular precarious) 
forms of  employment (roughly during the last decade)? 
Hypothesis: all respective unions have since the mid-2000s increasingly addressed precarious work and 
pursued a more outsider-encompassing agenda. For example:  
 Guidelines for Interviewee from Germany: IG Metall und Leiharbeit; Ver.di schon von Anfang an durch 
z. B. Forderung nach Mindestlohn, Mobilisierung gegen Hartz Reformen, Organizing 
Kampagnen etc. 
 Guidelines for Interviewee from Slovenia: lobbying for universal improvements (e.g. higher minimum 
wages and against the pension reform), lobbying against mini-Jobs and spread of  temporary work  
 Guidelines for Interviewees from Poland: campaign against “junk contracts”, “Euro-demonstration”; 
general strike 2013; organizing in unorganized precarious retail and security service sector 
- Do you share this impression? 
- How do you assess the respective unions´ agendas?  
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 Can you name highlights? What are successes? How were successes achieved?  
• Examples for sectoral collective bargaining? 
• Examples for national tripartite negotiations? 
• Role of  organizing campaigns?  
• Cooperation with social movements?  
• Provision of  particular offers for precarious workers, e.g. consultation offices?  
• Demand for particular participation rights for precarious workers (e.g. for 
temporary workers in works councils?) 
 Do you deem them sufficient? What is missing? 
 Where are contradictions and tensions? (e.g. leadership, rank and file) 
 
2. Main industrial relations institutions constraining or facilitating union policies towards 
dualization 
Question: What are the main institutional characteristics of  the industrial relations system and how do 
they constrain, enhance and shape unions´ strategies to respond to precarization?  
Guidelines for Interviewee from Germany: 
- Wie bewerten Sie den Effekt der relative starken Institutionalisierung von organisierter Arbeit durch 
Institutionen des Korporatismus in Deutschland?  
 Führt sie zu einem starken Legalismus und Benutzung von ´Verhandlungskanälen´ (bsp. 
Kampagnen nur im Rahmen von Tarifverhandlungen aber nicht außerhalb) um das Problem 
zu thematisieren und Forderungen zu stellen? 
 Erleichtert oder erschwert sie einen Umgang der Gewerkschaften mit dem Thema der 
Prekarisierung? 
- In Deutschland ist ein starker sektoraler Unterschied zu erkennen. IG Metall besitzt eine relative 
hohe strukturelle, organisatorische und institutionelle Macht. Ver.di hingegen verfügt über schwache 
Machtressourcen und ist in hohem Maße mit der Prekarisierung der Arbeit konfrontiert. Wie 
schätzen Sie diese unterschiedlichen Positionen in Bezug auf  die Umgangsstrategien ein? Zugespitzt 
formuliert: bleibt IG Metall am Verhandlungstisch während Ver.di mit sozialen Bewegungen auf  die 
Straße geht? 
- Es ist oft die Rede von der Erosion des deutschen Korporatismus und einer “unkontrollierten 
Dezentralisierung”. In Bezug auf  Gewerkschaftsstrategien, wie bewerten Sie diese Entwicklung und 
was ist in Zukunft zu erwarten? 
 
Guidelines for Interviewee from Slovenia: 
- How do you assess the effect of  the relatively strong institutionalization of  organized labour through 
neo-corporatist institutions in Slovenia?  
 Does this lead to focusing on negotiated channels (tripartite and bipartite negotiations) to 
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address the issue and pose demands? With which outcomes? 
 How can unilateral and more assertive campaigns as for instance against mini-jobs be 
explained?  
 Since the crisis, social dialogue is increasingly deteriorating. Can you assess whether and how 
this changes unions´ agendas? Are they becoming more assertive and search for coalition 
partners outside the tripartite system, for example with social movements?  
- How does neo-corporatism in Slovenia constrain or facilitate unions´ scope of  action to respond to 
deregulation at the margins of  the labour market?  
 
Guideline for Interviewees from Poland: 
- How do you assess the effect of  the weak institutionalization, the fragmentation and decentralization 
of  organized labour in Poland?  
 On the basis of  the work of  Adam Mrozowicki, I argue that this has led unions to resort to 
other, non-negotiated, non-institutional channels (e.g. public campaigning, organizing) 
 Less need for compromise, less pacification, more urged to come up with innovative, powerful 
unilateral actions is that what can be observed in Poland or would that be too much of  a 
romantic image of  the Polish union confederations? 
- Can you think of  alternative explanatory factors explaining Polish unions´ stance towards 





Appendix 3: Industrial Relations Systems in Comparison  
3a) Industrial relations systems in selected EU countries 
 
Source: Glassner and Keune 2010: 25  
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Appendix 4: Labour Market Statistics 
4a) Unemployment rate, aged 15-64, all persons 
 
Source: OECD 2014a 
 
4b) Unemployment rate, aged 15-24, all persons 
 
Source: OECD 2014b 
 
4c) Persons employed part-time in the EU in 2011 (% of total employment) 
 
Source: Eurostat 2013a 
 
4d) Proportion of employees with a contract of limited duration, age group 15-64, 2011 
(% of total employees) 
 




4e) Low-wage employment in 2010 in the EU 
 
Source: IAB 2013: 3 
 
Appendix 5: Trade Union Density and Collective Bargaining Coverage  
 
(a: For some countries, 2008 or 2009) 
Source: Bernaciak et al. 2014: 1 (based on ICTWSS database) 
